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Summary of our response 
Scope of the Call for Evidence and objectives in respect of flexibility 
We welcome the attention being paid by Ofgem and BEIS to the need for flexibility in 
%ULWDLQ·VHOHFWULFLW\V\VWHP,QRXUYLHZWKHPDLQUHDVRQWRVXSSRUWHOHFWULFLW\V\VWHP
flexibility is that it cDQKHOSPLQLPLVHWKHFRVWVRIPHHWLQJWKH8.·VVWDWXWRU\FOLPDWHWDUJHWV
ZKLOVWHQVXULQJWKDWV\VWHPVHFXULW\LVQRWFRPSURPLVHG7KHHOHFWULFLW\V\VWHP·VDELOLW\WR
adapt to changing demand in timescales of years down to minutes and varying availability of 
power from different resources will be extremely important to meeting these policy goals. 
Furthermore, action is needed so that those consumers that are best able to adapt their 
patterns of use of electricity have sufficient incentives and rewards for doing so. One 
manifestation of the main goal in accommodating future generation and demand is an 
objective to maximise the utilisation (across each year of operation) of electricity system 
assets, i.e. generators, network components and storage facilities. 
:KLOVWWKHWLWOHRIWKHFDOOIRUHYLGHQFHIRFXVHVRQ¶DVPDUWIOH[LEOHHQHUJ\V\VWHP·PRVWRI
the raised relate to the electricity system. We have therefore focused most of our responses 
on electricity rather than the energy system as a whole. Our responses are selective. We 
have only answered those questions where we can offer relevant evidence, based on our 
research and expertise. 
Electricity storage 
Many storage technologies are relatively costly at present but have potential for cost 
reduction. Experience from other technologies, e.g. solar PV and wind, suggests that growth 
of a market for a technology can reduce costs, and incentives can play an important part in 
creating that market.  
The structure of use of system tariffs and the way storage is currently treated by them 
present barriers to the uptake of storage. We note that examples from other countries could 
provide useful models for reformed treatment of storage in Britain. Distribution network 
operators (DNOs) in Italy and in Belgium are allowed to own and operate battery storage, 
and there is no evidence that this has prevented the competitive functioning of the 
generation and supply markets. Italy allows DNOs to control batteries if this choice can be 
justified throughout a cost-benefit analysis showing that the storage system is the most 
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cost-efficient way to solve an identified system problem, as opposed to potential 
substitutes, such as building a new line. Belgium enables DNOs to operate batteries if they 
do not alter the competitive functioning of markets. 
Flexible demand 
The Call for Evidence SURSRVHVGHILQLWLRQVRID´VPDUWHQHUJ\V\VWHPµDQG´IOH[LELOLW\µ7KHVH
focus on the role of information technology in providing the ability ´WRLQWHJUDWHWKHDFWLRQV
RIXVHUVµ. Our view is that technology alone will not achieve the changes necessary to realise 
D´VPDUWHQHUJ\V\VWHPµRUWKHGHVLUHGOHYHOVRIIOH[LELOLW\RQWKHGHPDQGVLGH$QLPSRUWDQW
GLPHQVLRQUHIOHFWHGLQWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW·VH[LVWLQJDSSURDFKWRVPDUWPHWHUing, is to 
ensure that consumerVXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHDVRQIRUDQGRXWSXWVRI¶VPDUW·PHWHUV:HEHOLHYH
that the Call for Evidence underestimates the importance of active citizens and communities 
in delivering smart systems and flexibility. This citizen engagement with the energy system, 
if implemented carefully, could help to build trust in smart systems ² and help to drive 
widespread adoption. 
When discussing the potential contributions of the demand side to meeting emerging 
system challenges at least cost, we believe there is value in (a) distinguishing between 
demand reduction (achieved either through energy efficiency or through changed uses of 
energy, or through both) from flexible demand and (b) in respect of the latter, 
distinguishing between demand side response (rapid responses to unplanned events on the 
system) and demand side management (planned changes to the time profile of demand). 
We believe that two keys to realising the potential of flexible demand are as follows: 
1. making it as easy as possible for electricity consumers to control or schedule their 
use of electricity, or to have the confidence in service providers who can do so on 
their behalf; 
2. maximising the share of the benefits of demand flexibility that accrue to electricity 
consumers. 
Both of the above are likely to depend on services, products and innovations by parties 
other than the electricity user. 
7KHUROORXWRI¶VPDUW·PHWHUVDQGVPDUWV\VWHPVJHQHUDOO\VKRXOGEHVHHQDVDIDFLOLWDWRURI
informed consumer decision making, not a substitute for it. Government and Ofgem need to 
continue to require consumers to be informed about smart meters and displays at the point 
of installation. 
Pricing and tariffs 
In addressing potential pricing or tariff arrangements, we believe that two key principles 
should be kept in mind: 
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1. incentives should be directed at those parties that are able to respond to them; 
2. risks should be borne by those parties best able to manage them. 
We believe that one key objective in new pricing arrangements should be to incentivise 
flexibility on the demand side and, as a consequence, reduce the need for reserve 
generation and the associated capital and operating costs. It might also help to reduce 
network costs relative to the case of there being no demand flexibility. 
Uptake of time of use (ToU) and more complex tariffs in households and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) will be constrained by unfamiliarity with the concept and the 
potential complexity of some tariff arrangements. Active consumer decisions to move the 
point in time at which energy services are used are only likely if there is a significant and 
transparent consumer benefit. Moreover, some important demand flexibility opportunities 
rely on the storage of energy (thermally or electrochemically) without changes to the timing 
of the service gained from use of energy. Examples of energy services that can benefit from 
storage include electric vehicle charging, hot water tank heating and short term switching of 
refrigeration and air conditioning, as well as the long established option of storage heating. 
We note that a number aggregators and smaller retailers/suppliers have expressed the view 
WKDWWKHGRPLQDQFHRIWKHUHWDLOVXSSO\PDUNHWVE\¶WKHELJ·DQGWKHLUYHUWLFDOLQWHJUDWLRQ 
with generation interests significantly impact on the offering of attractive ToU tariffs. This, 
they argue, is because greater participation by the demand side in system balancing would 
take business away from their generation interests. 
Placing the costs and benefits of monitoring and management of consumer load profiles 
more clearly on individual suppliers provides an incentive that does not exist with the 
existing approach of using sets of standard load profiles. 
Procurement of system services 
It should be made easier for collections of ancillary or capacity services to be evaluated and 
compared with alternatives taking into account locational issues where they are significant, 
e.g. in helping to manage imports of power into an area or provide black start services. We 
would urge an alignment of procurement processes and associated tender rounds to allow 
combinations to be considered. However, in order that physical facilities that can provide 
only one or two services can still participate in relevant ancillary service markets, each 
service should still be priced separately even if an apparent premium is paid to some 
providers (by virtue of the combination being cost-effective). 
The changing generation mix is likely to give rise to a need for different volumes of dynamic 
services and, potentially, new services such as faster controlled responses, lower minimum 
stable generation or higher ramp rates. New ancillary services and associated markets might 
be defined. As far as possible, the definitions of these services should focus on what is 
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really of value to the electricity system as a whole, and not on the way it happens to be 
delivered by particular technologies. 
Price or use of system charging signals can and should be used to incentivise distributed 
generation (DG, i.e. generation connected within a distribution network) to connect at 
locations where the adverse impacts on the network are minimal. However, at some point, it 
is likely that adverse impacts, such as a need for active management (meaning some 
curtailment) of generation or network reinforcement are necessary and incentives on DNOs 
to carry out the most economically efficient actions will be critical.  
Interactions between transmission and distribution 
An oversight in GB electricity supply industry developments since liberalisation has been the 
neglect of interactions between transmission and distribution, and the failure to see the 
electricity infrastructure as part of one system, regardless of voltage level. Price signals 
should reflect, as far as possible, whole electricity system costs. In our view, this points to a 
need for a quite fundamental review of network charging arrangements across distribution 
and transmission, and not just to tinkering with distribution arrangements.  
Present day arrangements, in particular the fact that only the transmission network licensees 
have the established means in terms of facilities, processes and expertise to actively operate 
their systems and not just (as in the case of most current DNO practice) to respond to faults 
RUWRDGRSWLVRODWHGVLPSOHH[DPSOHVRIDXWRPDWHG¶DFWLYHQHWZRUNPDQDJHPHQW·$10DW
best risk a great deal of inefficiency in meeting future needs and, at worst, system instability 
and blackout. 
Simple, concrete action to improve the quality of data exchanges between DNOs and 
National Grid is long overdue and should be undertaken regardless of any more radical 
reforms of networks and their regulation or commercial arrangements. 
Industry leadership 
We do not agree with the Call for Evidence·VDVVHUWLRQ WKDW´WKHRQXVLVRQLQGXVWU\WR
DGGUHVVWKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWVLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHµ7KHVSHHGRIPDQ\RIWKHFKDQJHV
affecting the power system is a direct or indirect result of Government policy and the extent 
of likely future change is highly dependent on future policy, especially related to renewable 
generation and the electrification of transport and heat. BEIS and Ofgem can and should play 
a major role in providing clarity and leadership not just on system issues, but also on 
developments independent of the network licensees that are the fundamental drivers of 
change. 
2QHNH\OHVVRQLQUHVSHFWRIWKH'12V·DQGRQWKHLUEHKDOIWKHEnergy Networks 
$VVRFLDWLRQ·V(1$ leadership to date of innovation of GB power system methods, 
processes, standards and codes is that the reforms that we believe are now required cannot 
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be left to them to take forward. It might be argued that the National Electricity Transmission 
System Operator (NETSO) should assume a leadership role. However, it will be open to the 
same criticism of lack of independence as the ENA. In the absence of any other suitable 
body, leadership would seem to fall to Ofgem or BEIS. Although Ofgem and BEIS might 
argue, perhaps with reason, that they lack the knowledge to take a more active part, we 
believe that leaving leadership to the network licensees is much too passive and risks 
excessive delays in proposals for change being formed and tested. 
Roles in planning and operating the future power system 
Future arrangements for energy trading and system operation should be structured such 
that: 
x there is competition and choice for consumers; 
x the system can be safely operated in accordance with relevant physical limits; 
x energy FRQVXPHUV·access to the system is enabled; 
x the overall cost of the system is minimised with use made of suitable signals, such 
as locational prices or tariffs, aimed at parties able respond to them; 
x there is scope for innovation. 
Regardless of exactly how roles and responsibilities are attributed to different network 
licensees and connected parties, it will be important to have a common set of high level 
principles that apply across the power system regardless of location and voltage level, and a 
consistent set of standards and codes in respect of energy trading and retail, system access 
and connections, network investment and maintenance, system operation, and system 
resilience. The standards and codes should take due account of scale and spatial and 
temporal interactions. 
One general economic principle is that risk should be borne by those parties best placed to 
manage it. In the case of risk associated with planning and operation of distribution 
networks, it should be self-evident that a DNO has better access to information to enable its 
management than the operator of a connected DG and should therefore be obliged to take 
on some of the risk associated with, for example, curtailment of generation. 
An enhanced role for the NETSO ² whether as an Independent System Operator (ISO) or not, 
whether for-profit or not ² increases reliance on a single monolithic service provider. In 
deciding which parties should have which roles in future, we believe the following should be 
considered:  
x How can the NETSO be encouraged to innovate and improve?  
x What benefits might come from having a range of parties all fulfilling similar 
functions (albeit perhaps with spatially delineated scope) whose performance can be 
compared one with another? 
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x Which parties have the requisite network knowledge and, if they currently lack all the 
expertise required to deliver future needs at least cost, can they acquire it? 
x What information and communication technology (ICT) developments are required to 
facilitate different role models and do some, e.g. single, large ICT systems, entail 
greater risk than many smaller ones? 
Evidence and access to data 
One particular challenge, faced by anyone attempting to develop evidence highlighting the 
extent of the challenges the power system faces or in support of particular interventions, is 
access to relevant data describing the GB power system now from which possible future 
scenarios can be developed. This is hindered by much of what is required to model the GB 
V\VWHPEHLQJUHJDUGHGDV´FRPPHUFLDOO\FRQILGHQWLDOµHYHQWKRXJK it is sometimes hard to 
envisage what commercial advantage might come from having it or commercial 
disadvantage might come from disclosing it. The UK Government and Ofgem should take 






We welcome the attention being paid by Ofgem and BEIS to the need for flexibility in 
%ULWDLQ·VHQHUJ\V\VWHP7KHV\VWHP·VDELOLW\WRDGDSWWRFKDQJLQJGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\LQ
timescales of years down to minutes and varying availability of power from different 
UHVRXUFHVZLOOEHH[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQWWRPHHWLQJHQHUJ\XVHUV·H[SHFWDWLRQVIRUUHOLDEOH
supply at least cost while still meeting decarbonisation targets. Whilst the title of the call for 
HYLGHQFHIRFXVHVRQ¶DVPDUWIOH[LEOHHQHUJ\V\VWHP·PRVWRIWKH raised relate to the 
electricity system. We have therefore focused most of our responses on electricity rather 
than the energy system as a whole. Our responses are selective. We have only answered 
those questions where we can offer relevant evidence, based on our research and expertise. 
Electricity is just one of a number of energy vectors, albeit an extremely important one: the 
WHFKQRORJ\XQGHUSLQQLQJWKH¶LQIRUPDWLRQDJH·DQGD¶NQRZOHGJHHFRQRP\·GHSHQGVRQLWDV
does much of industry and many of the facets of modern life that are often taken for 
granted. Although one objective in respect of policy towards the electricity system will be to 
make it as cheap for energy users as possible, this objective cannot be divorced from the 
need to meet statutory emissions reduction targets to help tackle climate change, and the 
imperative of maintaining the security of the electricity system. The UK has very favourable 
renewable resources that are already making a significant contribution to our electricity mix. 
Renewables accounted for 25% of electricity generation in 2015. They can generate much 
more than this, though that will not be without challenges. Some renewables are 
approaching a point where they will soon be cost competitive with fossil generation, 
especially if carbon costs are taken into account. Moreover, these and other low carbon 
sources of electricity could present strategic opportunities for UK industry if industry has 
sufficient confidence to invest in the medium to long-term. 
In spite of challenges that are being increasingly well recognised, a largely decarbonised 
electricity system remains will be crucial for the decarbonisation of the economy as a whole 
² including GHFDUERQLVLQJDWOHDVWSDUWRIWKH8.·VGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\IRUKHDWDQGIRU
transport. Indeed, as we note in our discussion of the issues raised in section 3.2 of the Call 
for Evidence, electrified heat and transport demand combined with appropriate energy 
storage facilities can be valuable sources of flexibility for the electricity system. In addition, 
the heat and electricity systems are currently coupled through the gas system that delivers a 
large part of the fuel and some degree of flexibility (for example, gas can be stored) for 
both and, in future, might be coupled through a hydrogen system that might also be linked 
to transport infrastructure.  
The following sections of this response follow the chapter structure of the Call for Evidence. 
In this initial section, we raise make some points about the underlying assumptions of the 
Call for Evidence that are not addressed in our responses to specific questions. 
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In general, the initial section of the Call for Evidence sets the context very well. However, it 
is stated in paragraph 10 that ´HIIRUWVWRPDNHRXUHQHUJ\V\VWHPVPDUWHUDUH
FRPSOHPHQWDU\WREULQJLQJIRUZDUGQHZJHQHUDWLRQJDVµ. Gas-fired generation offers one 
option for flexibility. Whilst we agree that gas-fired generation could play a significant role 
in UK electricity generation in the medium term, this role will need to be limited in the 
absence of CCS technologies being available1. Furthermore, smarter systems are part of the 
way that the use of gas can be reduced. Flexibility can be provided by flexible generation 
(such as gas), but also by storage, interconnection and flexible demand. Greater deployment 
of the last three options will therefore tend to reduce the requirement for new gas capacity. 
Competition within the Capacity Market has already revealed that this can be a significant 
effect. However, as UKERC has argued recently, the Capacity Market needs to be reformed so 
that supply, demand and other types of capacity are treated equitably2.  
The role of markets in energy policy is not represented entirely accurately in the Call for 
Evidence:HXQGHUVWDQGWKDW2IJHPLVUHTXLUHGWRFDUU\RXWLWVIXQFWLRQV´ZKHUHYHU
DSSURSULDWHE\SURPRWLQJHIIHFWLYHFRPSHWLWLRQµ)XUWKHUPRUHSDUDJUDSKRIWKHCall for 
Evidence states that ´DWWKHFHQWUHRIRXUDSSURDFKLVHQVXULQJHIIHFWLYHPDUNHWVDQG
comSHWLWLRQµ.  We agree that competition is very likely to be critical in bringing forward 
innovation in many areas of the system and support the proposals in the Call for Evidence to 
achieve this. However, there are some limits - most obviously with respect to networks - 
where regulation is required to protect consumer interests. Development of the regulatory 
mechanisms already begun by Ofgem to promote innovation in the networks (such as RIIO) 
will be critical to development of smarter systems. There are also important limits to the 
effectiveness of competition in some aspects of retail supply. These have been reported in 
very great detail in the recent report by the Competition and Markets Authority3. Our 
analysis4 is that new services, many of them dependenWRQ¶VPDUW·V\VWHPVDUHthe most 
likely sources of competition. Traditional energy supply business models have been less 
effective in securing effective consumer engagement and therefore require regulation to 
protect consumers, particularly vulnerable consumers.   
The Call for Evidence also neglects the importance of demand reduction in future energy 
systems. In paragraph 6, it is claimed that the future is likely to be ´PRUHSRZHUKXQJU\µ. We 
suspect that this refers to electricity demand, but the context of the paragraph is the energy 
system as a whole. We agree that electricity demand may begin to rise as transport and heat 
are partly electrified. However, all plausible future low carbon UK energy systems have an 
                                           
1 Ekins, P. et al, 2016. The Future of Gas in the UK. Research Report. London: UKERC. 
2 UKERC, 2016. Review of Energy Policy. UKERC Policy Briefing. London: UKERC. 
3 CMA, 2016. Competition and Markets Authority. Energy Market Investigation. Final Report. 
4 Eyre, N., Lockwood, M., 2016, The governance of retail energy market services in the UK: 
A framework for the future. UK Energy Research Centre. 
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overall decline in energy use, and electrification of heat and transport will be an important 
part of this process as both electric heating and transport systems can be significantly more 
efficient than the existing dominant technologies. Smart systems can have an important role 
to play in delivering demand reduction as well as demand flexibility, but the Call for 
Evidence tends to neglect the former. Our specific suggestions for energy efficiency policy 
are set out in more detail elsewhere5. In the context of this Call for Evidence, the role of 
much stronger action on energy efficiency and its links to smart systems warrant further 
attention. 
Paragraph 4 of the Call for Evidence SURSRVHVGHILQLWLRQVRID´VPDUWHQHUJ\V\VWHPµDQG
´IOH[LELOLW\µ7KHVHIRFXVRQWKHUROHRILQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\LQSURYLGLQJWKHDELOLW\´WR
LQWHJUDWHWKHDFWLRQVRIXVHUVµ. Our view, supported by evidence6, is that technology alone 
will not DFKLHYHWKHFKDQJHVQHFHVVDU\WRUHDOLVHD´VPDUWHQHUJ\V\VWHPµRUWKHGHVLUHG
levels of flexibility on the demand side. An important dimension, reflected in the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW·VH[LVWLQJDSSURDFKWRVPDUWPHWHULQJLVWRHQVXUHWKDWconsumers understand 
the reason for, and outputs of, ¶VPDUW·PHWHUVThe Call for Evidence underestimates the 
importance of active citizens and communities in delivering smart systems and flexibility. 
This citizen engagement with the energy system, if implemented carefully, could help to 
build trust in smart systems ² and help to drive widespread adoption. 
We note that, in spite of its publication having been delayed by the EU Referendum, the Call 
for Evidence provides no reference to international developments. Of these, we believe that 
Brexit has particular potential to impact on the issues raised in the Call for Evidence. A 
number of sources of flexibility, notably interconnection, are potentially affected by UK 
plans to leave the EU and the approach taken to Brexit. In addition, all issues related to 
electrical products currently rely on EU legislative processes. These will need to be kept in 
place or replaced by UK equivalents with international inter-operability, in a timely fashion, 
if progress is to be made in the development of smart systems. Furthermore, there are 
currently well-developed processes at a European level, led through the European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and complemented by work in 
the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) that, under current arrangements, will 
lead to changes in GB electricity system standards and codes. We also note that gas supply 
VHFXULW\¶VROLGDULW\·DUUDQJHPHQWVDUHPDGHDWD(XURSHDQOHYHO:HDSSUHFLDWHWKDW
Government has said that it is not yet in a position to set out detailed plans, but it would be 
useful to have an analysis of the issues around the electricity system, how the use of 
electricity might be affected, and what the options might be. 
                                           
5 See http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/news/ukerc-calls-for-urgent-action-on-uk-energy-during-
this-parliament.html  
6 For example, see Darby, S.J., Liddell, C., Hills, D., Drabble, D., 2015. Smart metering early 
learning project: synthesis report. Department of Energy and Climate Change, London. 
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2 Removing policy and regulatory barriers  
Chapter 2 of the Call for Evidence (CfE) focusses on one category of flexible technology 
(storage) and one category of market actor (aggregators). We agree that there are important 
new developments in both areas and that these merit full consideration. However, the 
structure of the chapter does risk neglecting issues that cut across different categories of 
technology and/or market actors. It is important to maintain a level playing field and 
therefore to consider the unintended barriers that might arise by neglecting cross-cutting 
issues. 
One example is the treatment of different flexible resources in the capacity market. The 
shorter contracts allowed for flexible demand and storage in the Capacity Market arguably 
constitute a regulatory barrier by comparison to generation. The debate has clearly been 
FRQVLGHUHGLQGHWDLOLQRWKHUSODFHVDQGRXUYLHZVDUHUHFRUGHGHOVHZKHUHHJ8.(5&·6
2016 Energy Policy Review7). For the purposes of this Call for Evidence we simply restate our 
view that a cross-cutting approach in which different flexible resources are treated 
equivalently is preferable. 
2.1.1 Storage 
Our responses to questions 1 to 6 have been led by Giorgio Castagneto Gissey and Paul 
Dodds of University College London. 
The removal of regulatory barriers could facilitate a smoother integration of energy storage 
resources in the UK power system. While the changes proposed by Ofgem and BEIS generally 
address this issue, we see several areas where the changes may risk introducing subtle new 
barriers, or do not fully address current barriers to the deployment of storage resources. We 
point out these issues and propose ways to promote a more extensive and inclusive 
integration of energy storage in the UK electricity systems. Our response primarily relates to 
regulatory barriers, issues related to ownership and operation by network companies, and 
challenges related to the nature of market design. 
 Have we identified and correctly assessed the main policy and regulatory barriers to the 
development of storage? Are there any additional barriers faced by industry? Please 
provide evidence to support your views. 
The CfE identifies and correctly assesses the main policy and regulatory barriers to the 
development of storage. We note how some of the mentioned barriers involve wider 
considerations, and that there are a number of key additional barriers. 
                                           
7 UKERC, 2016. Review of Energy Policy. UKERC Policy Briefing. London: UKERC.  
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We agree that the regulatory treatment of storage currently represents the most pressing 
issue that prevents the progression of storage. Based on evidence from numerous official 
documents, literature and regulations, our work has identified a substantial number of 
policy and regulatory barriers to the development of storage. A number of additional 
barriers to those mentioned in the CfE exist, and these can have a crucial impact on the 
incentives for both innovation and deployment. Our recent report8 and policy briefing9 
identify these additional challenges as: 
1. a lack of any form of direct support for storage; 
2. the absence of verified needs and roles for storage declared from an official 
government source, including advice on business models and regulatory viability of 
these, for each domain; 
3. up until the introduction Enhanced Frequency response in the second half of 2016, a 
lack of very fast response balancing and ancillary markets; 
4. the absence of unified and conclusive EU and national legal and regulatory 
frameworks, and regulatory differences between national markets; 
5. uncertainty regarding the ownership and operation of storage assets; 
6. the lack of policy/regulatory reflection of the substantial dependency of storage on 
wider electricity system developments; 
7. competition with other balancing and ancillary service assets; 
8. uncertain public attitudes towards storage10; 
9. a lack of ancillary service performance accuracy payments, such as within the 
frequency response service; 
10. the presence of open-ended contracts for delivery of electricity at any time during 
long periods in the capacity market, via open-ended capacity contracts, which 
cannot practically be met by storage; 
11. the sharpening of cash-out pricing in the Balancing Mechanism, something that has 
been much discussed in recent years and which, in our opinion, remains important in 
providing incentives to potential investment in and utilisation of storage. 
                                           
8 Castagneto Gissey and Dodds, 2016, Regulatory barriers to energy storage deployment. 
An overview of the UK market, RESTLESS, http://www.restless.org.uk/project-results  
9 Castagneto Gissey et al., 2016, Regulatory barriers to energy storage deployment: the UK 
perspective, RESTLESS, http://www.restless.org.uk/project-results  
10 Public attitudes against energy technologies are discussed in Pidgeon et al., 2014, 
Creating a national citizen engagement process for energy policy. PNAS 111:p13606. While 
WKHUHDUHFXUUHQWO\QRVWXGLHVDGGUHVVLQJFLWL]HQV·YLHZVRIHQHUJ\VWRUDJHWHFKQRORJLHVD
lack of understanding of these and their physical characteristics could provide substantial 




A number of these barriers are derived from the regulatory definition of storage, and 
introducing a new definition (as discussed in Q5 below) would likely facilitate the removal of 
several barriers to storage.11 We recommend that Ofgem/BEIS identify such relationships 
between barriers, in order to better understand and remove barriers to deployment. Figure 1 
shows relationships that we have identified.  Other barriers, such as the final three listed 
above, are technical market rules that practically (and perhaps unintentionally) reduce the 
competitiveness of storage technologies in some existing markets where they might on the 
surface be expected to thrive. 
Many storage technologies are noticeably costly at present but have potential for cost 
reduction. Experience from other technologies, e.g. solar PV and wind, suggests that growth 
of a market for a technology can do much to reduce costs, and incentives can play an 
important part in creating that market12. Such support has previously targeted generation 
technologies rather than technologies such as storage, which contribute to system balancing 
and stability. Storage could provide a key contribution to integrating high levels of 
renewables into the electricity system, but at the moment the incentives for renewables do 
not reflect the system integration challenges that they create. One approach, adopted by 
California, is to require renewable generators to invest in storage assets to reduce the 
impacts of intermittent generation. 
                                           
11 Castagneto Gissey and Dodds, 2016, Regulatory barriers to energy storage deployment. 
An overview of the UK market, RESTLESS, http://www.restless.org.uk/project-results 
12 See, for example, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1999. What are the Appropriate 





Figure 1 ² Relationship between barriers to energy storage deployment in the UK electricity 
markets. 
 Have we identified and correctly assessed the issues regarding network connections for 
storage? Have we identified the correct areas where more progress is required? Please 
provide evidence to support your views. 
We broadly agree with the identification of the issues regarding network connections for 
storage as set out in the CfE. 
It remains unclear how network connections will be priced in the future to reflect the unique 
characteristics of electricity storage. Depending on the generation portfolio, location and 
choice of storage technology, it could support the electricity system by meeting peak loads, 
reducing peak network flows and hence managing network constraints. One approach for 
the Government to consider would be charging models and network connection tariffs that 
reflect the size, use and location of the storage connection13. 
At present, use of system electricity tariffs, such as TNUoS14 and DUoS15 charges currently 
do not provide incentives for charging of storage during periods of high electricity demand 
                                           
13 US Department of Energy, 2013, Grid Energy Storage 
14 Transmission Network Use of System 
15 Distribution Use of System 
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and they have been shown to improve the arbitrage value of storage.16 However, tariffs 
specifically relying on the time of export may be more effective in avoiding generation 
curtailment and relieving network constraints. This issue is clearly linked to the types of 
business models used by the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) and the transmission 
licensees. The DNO Contracted and Contracted Services model could better support the 
operation of storage so long as the tolling contracts between DNOs and the third party 
operating the storage were not too complex (as these could affect system flexibility and 
security).  In many respects, storage and additional network capacity represent alternatives 
to each other. We encourage Ofgem and the Government explore alternative regulated 
business models for network owners and system operators to reduce impediments to 
storage investments, including both ownership constraints and avoiding disincentives where 
storage could reduce network income. The scope for a choice to be made between investing 
in storage at a given location instead of extra network capacity should be widened where it 
can be shown that storage is the most economic option taking into account all the services 
it can offer. 
Incentives could be provided for heat maps to offer providers useful information about 
demands throughout the network and might incentivise deployment of storage in optimal 
locations in distribution networks. 
 Have we identified and correctly assessed the issues regarding storage and network 
charging? Do you agree that flexible connection agreements could help to address 
issues regarding storage and network charging? Please provide evidence to support your 
views, in particular on the impact of network charging on the competitiveness of storage 
compared to other providers of flexibility. 
The definition of storage as an intermittent or non-intermittent generator is a key issue 
because TNUoS and DUoS charges can be substantially different. Storage is currently 
recognised as non-intermittent, implying that it can connect to the distribution network and 
be relied upon to generate at peak times, which seems appropriate.17 Defining storage as 
intermittent would increase the cost of deploying storage by increasing the network tariffs. 
A competitive market for storage is one where storage is treated equally to other generation 
resources (and with other sources of system flexibility as argued earlier in this submission). 
At the moment, this is not the case since transmission-scale storage must pay double 
TNUoS, for charging and discharging, double DUoS charges, as well as the Climate Change 
Levy (CCL). If the generator is under 100 MW, as will be the case for most electricity storage 
                                           
16 Strbac et al., 2016, Can storage help reduce the cost of a future UK electricity system?, 
Report for the Carbon Trust 




in the near future, they are not liable to pay TNUoS, but must still pay DUoS tariffs. These 
double charges do not reflect the complementary benefits of energy storage to the networks 
in balancing the wider electricity system ² one moves electricity in time, while the other 
moves electricity across space. In most cases, storage is used for balancing, which does not 
contribute to congestion but instead can relieve it. Therefore, it might be appropriate to 
apply lower network fees for storage that better reflect the role of storage in the electricity 
system. Flexible connection agreements could be useful to lower network tariffs to be paid 
by storage providers if they were appropriately implemented. This specifically entails 
enabling storage to be charged with network tariffs that reflect the fact that storage is likely 
to export power at times of peak load, and import power at times of peak generation, 
reducing the market tightness and stress on the network. 
Furthermore, the way in which storage is treated under the CCL framework remains unclear. 
The CCL is calculated at the point where electricity is delivered from generation to a UK 
distribution or transmission system; however, if export of electricity from a storage device 
relies on the import of electricity (from a Levy Exemption Certificate-owning generator) and 
then the export of this electricity, the issuing of a new LEC at the point of export (since 
storage is considered a generator) implies a double LEC. Therefore, it could be argued that 
storage should not be eligible for LECs, which currently represent a considerable barrier to 
the optimal deployment of storage resources. 
 Do you agree with our assessment that network operators could use storage to support 
their networks? Are there sufficient existing safeguards to enable the development of a 
competitive market for storage? Are there any circumstances in which network 
companies should own storage? Please provide evidence to support your views. 
Do you agree with our assessment that network operators could use storage to support their 
networks? 
Storage can already provide a cheaper alternative to distribution network reinforcement in 
some niche locations. 
As the share of intermittent renewable generation increases, the value of storage in moving 
excess generation at times of low demand in order to meet demand peaks will greatly 
increase. Electricity markets need to be designed to encourage the optimal deployment and 
use of storage to support the system. (See our answer to question 3). 
The unbundling regulations in the Electricity Directive require DNOs to employ a third party 
to operate a small storage device, in order not to affect the competitiveness of the 
generation and supply markets; on the other hand, transmission licensees are completely 
banned from owning or operating any form of storage. With their superior information 
about electricity demands through space and time, network companies are in the best 
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position to realise and optimise the value of storage within the system. However, their 
ability to do so with present regulations would undermine the competitiveness of storage. 
Given an incentive to minimise long-run costs of system balancing, a truly independent 
system operator that can commission storage but can profit neither from energy arbitrage 
nor from an enlarged asset base could maintain the competitive functioning of the 
generation and supply markets.  
Whether the value streams to storage from grid services are effectively realised depends on 
the methodology used to reward storage for the operational benefits they supply to the 
system with grid services. While flexible connection agreements can help storage access 
value from its provision of flexibility, policies aimed at improving ancillary market signals 
could be a key factor in enabling higher levels of energy storage deployment. For example, 
it is our understanding that the frequency response service only involves an availability 
payment, and does not provide any separate payment for performance accuracy, which 
could be useful in improving the value of storage. 
Are there sufficient existing safeguards to enable the development of a competitive market 
for storage? 
The development of a competitive market for storage depends on the provision of a level-
playing field between storage and other resources, as well as how storage is utilised by 
network operators and how storage services are sold within the electricity system. 
A number of business models for ownership of distribution-scale storage have been 
proposed.18 Among these, the issue of respecting horizontal integration unbundling and 
thus safeguarding competition in the generation and supply markets is, in our view, 
considerably less important in the DNO Contracted and Contracted Services business 
models since the distribution businesses would take a reduced role in asset operation under 
these models. These challenges may be overcome by allowing distribution businesses to be 
actively involved in buying and selling energy for balancing purposes, e.g. through use of 
storage, in a way similar to National Grid. Yet, this may result in the distortion of 
competition and restrictions to avoid trading for any other purpose that does not directly 
involve balancing the system must be required, thus activities such as speculative trading 
should be banned in such case.19  
While the DNO Contracted and Contracted Services business models entail the most 
balanced compromise between commercial risk for the DNO and the operating third party, 
the viability of these models depends on the complexity of the tolling contract, and whether 
                                           
18 UK Power Networks, 2014, Smarter Network Storage business model consultation 
19 Pöyry, 2013, Storage business models in the GB market, Report to Elexon 
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the third party is willing to take on long-term risk for additional value streams.20 Ofgem 
should monitor the simplicity of these contracts in order to prevent these from impinging on 
system flexibility and efficiency. Similarly, market-based price signals attached to DUoS 
charges should ideally incentivise the third party to take on long-term risk for additional 
value streams in a way that safeguards consumer prices and system flexibility. 
A well-structured tolling contract would be one which gives the third party as much control 
over the asset as possible without negatively affecting network security. Furthermore, under 
the DNO Contracted model, there is more flexibility for the DNO to share some of the 
commercial risk if the DNO can take some merchant exposure, but this needs to be 
appropriately incentivised, through appropriate signals. 
A detailed appraisal of the benefits and potential concerns of these business models might 
remove some ownership and operational barriers and encourage investment. 
Are there any circumstances in which network companies should own storage? 
Network companies should be allowed to own storage if it can be ensured that they treat 
storage as an integral part of the system, although this could require rules that ring-fence 
them from interacting with other markets.  
DNOs in Italy and DSOs in Belgium are allowed to own and operate battery storage, and 
there is no evidence that this has prevented the competitive functioning of the generation 
and supply markets. Italy allows DNOs to control batteries if this choice can be justified 
throughout a cost-benefit analysis showing that the storage system is the most cost-
efficient way to solve the identified problem, as opposed to potential substitutes, such as 
building a new line. Belgium enables DSOs to operate batteries if they do not alter the 
competitive functioning of markets.21 Given the benefits that network companies would be 
able to provide to the system by using storage, they should be given a chance to do so if 
they are able to show that storage is more cost-efficient compared to alternatives and in the 
case their ownership of storage did not alter competition in other markets. 
If a DNO decided to deploy storage today using the generation licence exemption, it might 
overspend its capital allowance, but would only receive little income via the restrictive de 
minimis requirements.22 ,ID'12XVHGD¶VWDQGDUG·DSSURDFKWRMXVWLI\LWVXVHRIVWRUDJH
                                           
20 UK Power Networks, 2014, Smarter Network Storage business model consultation 
21 DG ENER, 2012, The future role and challenges of energy storage 
22 The de minimis requirements are included in the distribution licence and require that: (i) 
total turnover from non-distribution businesses shall be one of 2.5% or less of total revenue 
of the DNOs from distribution; and, (ii) aggregate investments in non-distribution activities 




(i.e. conventional asset replacement, or reinforcement), its activity would need to be 
assessed based on the expected efficient costs for the substitute asset type, which would 
feed into its revenue and the regulatory asset value. This assessment reflects a key barrier 
to storage deployment in that it fails to consider the whole set of benefits to the wider 
energy system that storage could deliver, aside from those delivered to the DNO itself. 
Similarly, it can be argued that transmission licensees should be allowed to own storage if 
they can show that storage is the most cost-efficient solution to the identified network 
problem, and if they can show that the competitiveness of markets is not altered. Italy and 
Belgium have more flexible approaches to TSO ownership than Britain. Italian law allows 
TSOs to build and operate batteries, if this can be justified with a cost-benefit analysis that 
shows the cost-efficiency of storage compared to alternatives.23 Belgium similarly allows 
TSOs ownership of storage devices if this does not prevent the competitive functioning of 
markets.24 Similar approaches could be considered for Britain. 
 Do you agree with our assessment of the regulatory approaches available to provide 
greater clarity for storage? Please provide evidence to support your views, including any 
alternative regulatory approaches that you believe we should consider, and your views 
on how the capacity of a storage installation should be assessed for planning purposes. 
We are concerned that the assessment focuses on the need for a new definition. Our work 
suggests that previous experience from the gas market, whilst defining gas storage as an 
independent asset class,25 was not sufficient to remove regulatory barriers,26. In that case, 
the European Commission has raised concerns that current regulations are insufficiently 
specific on required strategic stock levels to ensure security, and that regulations should 
consider the relative roles of interconnection capacity and local production.27 A regulatory 
approach that improves the ability of storage to access revenue streams not only in terms of 
capacity but also from ancillary services would improve the business case for storage. 
Since storage is never a positive net electricity generator, it can be argued that it does not 
act as a generator and should not be liable to pay tariffs as a generator, including DUoS 
tariffs. The payment of the CCL as a generator and consumer could similarly be reviewed. 
Since the CCL does not relate to the use of network capacity, one approach would be to 
waive the CCL payment of storage as a generator, while maintaining the payment as a 
                                           
23 Italian decree law 93/11, Art. 36, par.4 
24 Belgian Electricity Act, Article 9(1) 
25 Ofgem, 2015, Guidance on the regulatory regime for gas storage facilities in Great Britain 
26 Castagneto Gissey et al., 2016, Regulatory barriers to energy storage deployment: the UK 
perspective, RESTLESS 
27 DG ENER, 2015, Energy Storage: Which Market Designs and Regulatory Incentives Are 
Needed? Report for European Parliament 
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consumer. This could be justified by the net generating position of storage, which would 
point to its sole payment as a consumer, which might better reflect its benefit to the system 
in integrating intermittent renewable capacity. 
 Do you agree with any of the proposed definitions of storage? If applicable, how would 
you amend any of these definitions? Please provide evidence to support your views. 
We broadly agree with the definition provided by the Electricity Storage Network (ESN), which 
has so far also been supported by industry. However, this definition does not fully 
differentiate storage from other forms of generation, nor does it fully differentiate it from 
network equipment such as transformers. The definition could be amended to reflect the net 
negative flow of electricity from the device and the fact that electricity is converted into 
other forms of energy before being reconverted back into electricity, in order to fully 
differentiate it from other generators and network equipment. 
An alternative definition of Electricity Storage could be: 
¶$PHDQVRIFRQYHUWLQJLPSRUWHGHOHFWULFLW\LQWRDIRUPRIHQHUJ\WKDWLVVWRUHGDQG
can be reconverted into electrical energy; is unable to produce a positive net flow of 
electrical energy from the device; and for which, given sufficient margin to increase 
or decrease the state of charge, the timing of imports and exports can, under normal 
operating conditions, be controlled independently of each other and the voltage at 
the point of connection to the power system· 28 
7KHZRUGLQJ¶WKDWLVXQDEOHWRSURGXFHDSRVLWLYHQHWIORZRIHOHFWULFDOHQHUJ\IURPWKH
GHYLFH·ZRXOGHIIHFWLYHO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHVWRUDJHIURPRWKHUgenerators, but would not exclude 
storage from being recognised for its generation and demand properties. This definition 
might enable the setting of a network tariff that reflected the weighted sum of generation 
and consumption tariffs to better reflect its role as both a generator and a consumer. 
The reference to control of the timing of imports and exports is intended to ensure that 
network assets such as capacitors and transformers are not caught by our proposed 
definition but to leave the way open for supercapacitors to be treated as Electricity 
Storage29. 
2.2 Aggregators 
 What are the impacts of the perceived barriers for aggregators and other market 
participants? Please provide your views on:  
 balancing services;  
                                           
28 This definition is based on one that was initially proposed in Castagneto Gissey et al., 
2016, Regulatory barriers to energy storage deployment: the UK perspective, RESTLESS. 
29 E.g. IEA, 2014, Technology Roadmap Energy Storage 
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 extracting value from the balancing mechanism and wholesale market;  
 other market barriers; and  
 consumer protection.  
Do you have evidence of the benefits that could accrue to consumers from removing or 
reducing them? 
 
 What are your views on these different approaches to dealing with the barriers set out 
above? 
 
 What are your views on the pros and cons of the options outlined in Table 5? Please 
provide evidence for your answers. 
 
 'R\RXDJUHHZLWKRXUDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHULVNVWRV\VWHPVWDELOLW\LIDJJUHJDWRUV·





3 System Value Pricing 
Our responses to the questions posed in chapter 3 of the Call for Evidence have been led by 
Keith Bell with contributions from Nick Eyre and Graeme Hawker. 
The UK Energy Research Centre has recently published a working paper30 that aims to 
provide an accessible summary of the need for enhanced flexibility on the power system and 
improved transmission-distribution coordination. We therefore do not go into the full 
motivation here but refer readers to that paper. However, here we highlight what we see as a 
need for greater clarity in respect of the terms used to describe the potential contributions 
RIGHPDQGLHD¶WD[RQRP\·RI´PDQDJHPHQWRIGHPDQGµ:HEHOLHYHWKLVZLOOEHimportant 
when considering which ancillary services the demand side might offer, how much of each 
might be available, how they might be accessed and what risks might be associated with 
depending on them, e.g. will they be delivered and delivered quickly enough when required. 
It is also important when considering price signals such as via half-hourly tariffs or use of 
system charges. 
The taxonomy we propose is illustrated in Figure 2. It, in turn, drew on ideas in a number of 
other publications, e.g. by EPRI31 and CIGRE32. 
                                           
30 Transmission-distribution coordination and transition to more actively operated 
distribution: why it matters. Keith Bell, UKERC 2017 
31 C W Gellings, The Concept of Demand-Side Management for Electric Utilities. 
Proceedings of the IEE, 1985. 73(10): p. 1468-1470. 
32 CIGRE Working Group C6.09, Demand Side Integration, Technical Brochure TB 475, 




Figure 2 - A taxonomy of management of demand 
Frequency response on the GB power system is an automatic, real-time response to 
observed changes in system frequency, those changes being generally unintended and 
unavoidable. Taking a lead from this, we define Demand Side Response (DSR) as a response 
to some unplanned change - this could be a change in system frequency, for example, or a 
rise in loading on an overhead line to near or above its thermal limit, perhaps due to a fault 
on another line. 
If the sum total demand is not fundamentally being reduced, all that is being done is 
changing the time at which demand needs to be met. Exactly when that later increase in 
demand takes place is uncertain and could come at a very inconvenient time33. 
Demand Side Management (DSM) seeks to overcome the problem with DSR by considering a 
period of time and scheduling different levels of demand at different times within that 
period, under the constraint that the total demand for energy is met within that interval and 
that instantaneous demand for power neither exceeds nor falls below certain, defined limits. 
Given that power prices or power from renewable resources vary within the given time 
interval, the objective might be either to minimise total cost of energy in that period or 
PLQLPLVHWRWDO¶VSLOOHG·RUFXUWDLOHGUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\ The downside of DSM is that, in order 
                                           
33 It can be envisaged that a demand-side response could involve the energy service, or 
some part of it, being foregone completely rather than being delayed. However, we would 




demand, the amount of demand that is flexible, prices, and of intermittent sources of 
generation (e.g. wind or solar power). 
Because they both involve changes to patterns of demand relative to what would otherwise 
have occurred, we bring DSM and DSR together under the collective heading of Flexible 
Demand. The key difference between DSM and DSR, as we see it, is that DSM is planned - 
albeit perhaps at short notice or for a short period - while DSR is a response to something 
that is unplanned34. 
7KHUHDUHZHZKDWZHFDOO¶GLUHFW·RU¶LQGLUHFW·PHWKRGVE\ZKLFK'60RU'65 might be 
actuated35. Both are affected by uncertainties but the former should be something in which 
a system operator can have more confidence36. A price signal ² whether a real-time price or 
D¶VWDWLF·WDULII² is an indirect control37; there is reliance on electricity consumers being 
influenced by the signal to change when they use electricity or to reduce use right now. How 
many of them do that and by how much is subject to uncertainty, though over time it ought 
to be possible to assemble reasonable statistical models to allow a good prediction of 
patterns of demand or levels of response. 
 What types of enablers do you think could make accessing flexibility, and seeing a 
benefit from offering it, easier in future? 
The concept of system value is welcome, but the practice will need to reflect the complexity 
of future systems. The appropriate price needs to reflect costs from the wholesale market, 
                                           




required to be available at a particular time just in case it is needed. This need for margin 
might lead to particular pricing arrangements: one fee for being available to provide a 
response; another for utilisation when the response is actuated. Correct remuneration for 




allows the use of direct control. 
36 There might be failures or delays to communications or failure of a switch to operate, 
but they should be rare. However, e.g. when a demand reduction response is sought, there 
is also some uncertainty about the exact level of demand and what proportion of it is 
controllable. Something cannot be switched off if it is already switched off. 
37 Different forms of pricing arrangements are each a form of indirect control. Some seek to 
LQIOXHQFHD¶VHQVLEOH·VFKHGXOLQJRIGHPDQGRWKHUVVHHk to elicit a change right now. 
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grid and flexibility costs (i.e. ability to flex within a half hour and provide ancillary services). 
Signals for investment also need to include capacity costs. The move towards increased use 
of very low marginal cost generation is increasing the periods of time with low short run 
marginal costs, and therefore low wholesale market prices. The appropriate cost signals for 
investment (long run cost) versus operation (short run cost) may therefore differ very 
significantly. This implies that average prices may fall in wholesale markets, but rise in 
capacity and flexibility markets. Within any one particular geographical area, it is difficult to 
HQYLVDJHWKHVHPDUNHWVEHLQJHIIHFWLYHDVDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQ¶VLQJOHEX\HU·SURFXUHPHQW
markets, pointing to the continued importance of governance and regulation of monopoly 
licensees (e.g. system operators at various scales). 
Flexible generation, flexible demand, two-way storage38 and network capacity all have the 
potential to provide useful system services. In many respects, these offer different types of 
flexibility and, in certain respects, providers of flexibility in different locations, can be seen 
RIIHULQJDOWHUQDWLYHVWRHDFKRWKHU)RUH[DPSOHWZRIRUPVRI¶IOH[LELOLW\·DUHWKHDELOLW\RI
generators to reduce outputs and, given sufficient notice, their ability to increase output. As 
well assisting the National Electricity Transmission System Operator (NETSO) in the 
management of overall system power balance, these help to resolve local power imbalances 
within the limits of the network connecting two or more areas, mainly through the balancing 
PHFKDQLVP+RZHYHULQWKHPHGLXPWRORQJWHUPVXPVVSHQWRQ¶ELGV·DQG¶RIIHUV·WR
address local imbalance can be reduced through investment in additional network capacity 
that allows local deficits of demand relative to generation to be addressed by importing 
surpluses from other areas. 
As will no doubt be discussed by other respondents to the Call for Evidence, one particular 
difficulty at present is represented by the range of different services and their associated 
procurement and remuneration arrangements. The different services reflect different 
temporal and spatial aspects of system operation; few, if any, potential providers of 
flexibility can offer all of them. Thus, while the definitions of some services might be revised 
to beWWHUUHIOHFWZKDWLVQHHGHGDQGZKDWFDQUHDOLVWLFDOO\EHSURYLGHGHJ¶SULPDU\·
¶VHFRQGDU\·DQG¶KLJKIUHTXHQF\·UHVSRQVH39, the different categories are useful. However, it 
                                           
38 The electricity system already makes considerable use of energy storage and the 
flexibility it represents. However, the vast majority of it concerns only a one-way energy 
conversion, e.g. from the chemical energy embodied in a mass of coal or methane into 
electrical energy. The conversion processes associated with fossil fuels and nuclear fission 
are also relatively slow to get started or to ramp up or down. 
39 At the launch event for the 2016 System Operability Framework, National Grid 
acknowledged that the current definitions of primary and secondary response are probably 
not totally fit for purpose. Because some providers, e.g. wind or solar, might be able to offer 
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should be made easier for collections of services to be evaluated and compared with 
alternatives. For example: 
x could a multi-year contract for availability of generation, exports of power from 
storage or reductions in demand, akin to contracts offered in the capacity market but 
taking account of location and of the duration of availability of power at key times 
other than simply system peak demand, represent a cost-effective alternative to 
extra network capacity to serve the highest levels of imports into an area? Or, having 
conducted a market test to see whether such services might be both available and 
cost-effective, could a lack of positive outcomes from such a test help to reduce 
uncertainty on the need for extra network capacity and, as a consequence, accelerate 
its delivery? 
x could a particular generator be cost-effective in respect of the combination of 
capacity, response, reactive power and black start services40 when, viewed solely in 
respect of, say, capacity, it seems more expensive than alternative sources of 
capacity that succeed in meeting total system need? 
Under present arrangements, some services are not considered at all, e.g. availability to 
meet local demand in a particular area in the longer term, or the procurement processes 
take place at different times from each other and completely independently of each other, 
e.g. capacity, response, black start and reactive power capability. 
Although there are likely to be considerable challenges in comparing many different 
combinations of services from different providers, we would urge an alignment of 
procurement processes and associated tender rounds to allow combinations to be 
considered. However, in order that physical facilities that can provide only one or two 
services can still participate in relevant ancillary service markets, each service should still be 
priced separately even if an apparent premium is paid to some providers (by virtue of the 
combination being cost-effective).  
Such a step ought to ensure that the total cost of the various services is minimised and 
should help generators, flexible demand and storage gain confidence in accessing multiple 
income streams. Such income streams will be increasingly important in an electricity system 
in which most energy comes from sources with very low marginal costs which, in 
competitive markets at times when there is no scarcity, would normally be expected to lead 
to low wholesale prices. Many of these sources have high capital costs; without sufficient 
income from sources other than the energy markets, their costs might not be recoverable. 
                                                                                                                                   
a cost-effective high frequency response service without also being cost-effective for low 
frequency response, we would add high frequency response to that list. 




However, in order that costs finally passed through to energy users are not excessive, care 
should be taken to ensure that service providers (a) are actually available when required, (b) 
do not get paid twice for the same action and (c) do not get paid for capabilities that are 
inherent in the equipment used and cannot not be delivered when earning income from 
energy or other services41. (The ability to evaluate combinations of services ought to 
alleviate the risks associated with the last of these). 
As we discuss in our answers to the questions posed in chapter 5 of the Call for Evidence, 
the potential for distributed energy resources (DER, i.e. generation, storage or flexible 
demand connected at distribution voltages) to provide services is becoming increasingly 
important. (DER also has the potential to increase the total cost of services excessively if not 
managed correctly). For flexible demand to contribute, it must be possible to remunerate it 
correctly and this depends on measuring it correctly. Half-hourly metering of demand 
promises to be a key enabler of DSM. However, the service provided by DSR (as we have 
defined it above) may be required to be delivered within a few seconds and, if there is some 
possibility of it not being delivered, would require some kind of extra monitoring in addition 
to half-hourly metering. 
One thing that is becoming apparent from some academic studies, past evaluations of the 
impacts of allowing single generator units larger than 1320MW to connect to the GB system, 
DQGFDQEHLQIHUUHGIURP1DWLRQDO*ULG·V6\VWHm Operability Framework, is that the changing 
generation mix is likely to give rise to a need for different volumes of dynamic services and, 
potentially, new services such as faster controlled responses, lower minimum stable 
generation or higher ramp rates42. New ancillary services and associated markets might be 
defined. As far as possible, the definitions of these services should focus on what is really of 
value to the system and not on the way it happens to be delivered by particular 
technologies. One exaPSOHLV¶LQHUWLDUHVSRQVH·7KHFRUHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUWKHSRZHUV\VWHP
is a very fast response to changes in the balance between generation and demand. Defined 
in one way, only synchronous generators directly coupled to the grid would be able to 
                                           
41 Examples of this includes generators with inherent capability to generate or absorb 
reactive power. They must be connected to the system in order to sell active power; up to 
certain levels of reactive power, there is no impact on active power exports from also 
producing or absorbing reactive power and we are not aware of evidence that such 
production or absorption incurs any significant cost to the generator. Another example is 
the use of a synchronous generator directly coupled to the grid. Whenever there is a change 
in system frequency, it inherentO\SURGXFHVDQ¶LQHUWLDUHVSRQVH·ZKLFKFDQQRWEHDYRLGHG 
42 Although it is smaller than the GB system, the power system on the island of Ireland is 
also an islanded system and experiences there of changing generation patterns provide an 
interesting point of study in respect of what we might expect in GB. The system operator 




between technologies even if, in practice, one particular technology has distinct advantages 
over others. 
 If you are a potential or existing provider of flexibility could you provide evidence on the 
extent to which you are currently able to access and combine different revenue streams? 
Where do you see the most attractive opportunities for combining revenues and what do 
you see as the main barriers preventing you from doing so? 
The UK Energy Research Centre is not an existing or potential provider of flexibility and so 
we do not answer this question. 
 If you are a potential or existing provider of flexibility could you provide evidence on the 
extent to which you are currently able to access and combine different revenue streams? 
Where do you see the most attractive opportunities for combining revenues and what do 
you see as the main barriers preventing you from doing so? 
The UK Energy Research Centre is not an existing or potential provider of flexibility and so 
we do not answer this question. 
 Can you provide evidence to support changes to market and regulatory arrangements 
WKDWZRXOGDOORZWKHHIILFLHQWXVHRIIOH[LELOLW\DQGZKDWPLJKWEHWKH*RYHUQPHQW·V
2IJHP·VDQG6\VWHP2SHUDWRU·VUROHLQPDNLQJWKHVHFKDQJHV" 
Evidence of a need for change to existing regulatory and commercial arrangements is 
represented by:  
x the gradual increase, over a number of years, in the total cost of balancing services; 
x the large sums paid in recent years by the NETSO for generators to absorb reactive 
power; 
x the significant increase in the cost of availability of black-start services from 
generators; 
x the introduction by National Grid of a new ancillary service, that of Enhanced 
Frequency Response (EFR). 
New ancillary service markets might be opened up and have the potential to drive 
investment in new equipment or equipment with enhanced capabilities. However, the full 
value of some of these services might not be revealed for some years. One potential 
provider of different ancillary services is combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation. 
Existing CCGTs in Britain were not generally designed for flexible operation; however, we 
understand that some newer designs do offer, for example, faster ramping or lower 
minimum stable generation (MSG), albeit at higher capital cost. Investment in new CCGT 
capacity is anticipated by many to take place in the next 2-3 years. This is likely to be 
before new ancillary services have been established or the value of enhanced ramping or 
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lower MSG has been revealed. However, new CCGT plant would normally be anticipated to 
operate for between 20 and 30 years, i.e. to still be in operation when enhanced capability is 
required. One option would be for Ofgem to require new CCGTs to have enhanced dynamic 
capabilities now rather than leaving it for a market that is yet to emerge to provide 
incentives to the provision of such capabilities? The benefits of doing this should be 
compared with the potential penalties arising from making general power system 
requirements too specific to particular technologies (which might reduce the level of 
competition between different technologies) or to the potential costs of retrofitting existing 
stations to make them more flexible at a later date. Alternatives to a general capability 
requirement include (i) allowing the service buyer to tender for capabilities somewhat in 
advance of need or (ii) allowing negotiation on enhanced capability and associated 
remuneration for the cost of that enhancement as part of a connection agreement.  
One difficulty with any of the above approaches lies in defining how much of a particular 
capability will be needed by the system. Inherent in that are (a) the need for detailed system 
modelling of future scenarios and (b) the risk of stranded assets. As well as requiring not 
just the development of credible future scenarios (in more detail than common in, for 
H[DPSOH1DWLRQDO*ULG·V)XWXUH(QHUJ\6FHQDULRVEXWjudgements about those that could 
be more likely, (a) requires considerable power system modelling expertise43; and (b) is 
likely to require a pragmatic approach such as adoption of what are judged to be least 
regret actions. 
3.1 Smart Tariffs 
Time-of-use (ToU) or locational pricing acts as a signal to users of electricity, generators or 
owners of storage to behave in particular ways, e.g. to orient their consumption or 
production towards particular times and away from others, the goal being to minimise the 
total cost of energy over a period of time or to maximise the social welfare. As such, pricing 
arrangements can act as incentives. However, although a particular arrangement might, in 
the long-run, succeed in meeting the overall goal, the variability and uncertainty associated 
with certain pricing arrangements also entail risk to individual parties. In addressing 
potential pricing or tariff arrangements, we believe that two key principles should be kept in 
mind: 
1. incentives should be directed at those parties that are able to respond to them; 
2. risks should be borne by those parties best able to manage them. 
                                           
43 Such forecasting and modelling expertise is required in any case and would allow 
National Grid ² or others ² to move beyond what the three System Operability Framework 
reports have done to date, i.e. to show that there are problems, and instead to also show 
some potential solutions. 
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We believe that one key objective in new pricing arrangements should be to incentivise 
flexibility on the demand side and, as a consequence, reduce the need for reserve 
generation and the associated capital and operating costs. It might also help to reduce 
network costs relative to the case of there being no demand flexibility. As Ofgem/BEIS have 
noted in their Call for EvidenceLWZLOOKRZHYHUEHLPSRUWDQWWRQRWH´WKHSRWHQWLDOVRFLDO
impacts of the smart tariffs that are enabled by half-hourly settlement, as different types of 
FRQVXPHUVZLOOEHDIIHFWHGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\VZLWKVRPHOHVVDEOHWREHQHILWWKDQRWKHUVµ)RU
example, some Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) trials of flexible demand have shown very 
little flexibility being offered by small commercial users of electricity and little apparent 
benefit from flexibility on the part of domestic consumers44. However, other trials (though 
small) have shown that, given suitable advice and support, domestic consumers, including 
those in social  housing, can offer flexibility and benefit from incentives to adopt particular 
patterns of use of electricity.  
We agree that uptake of ToU and more complex tariffs in households and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will be constrained by unfamiliarity with the concept and 
the potential complexity of some tariff arrangements. Active consumer decisions to move 
the point in time at which energy services are used are only likely if there is a significant and 
transparent consumer benefit. Moreover, some important demand flexibility opportunities 
rely on the storage of energy (thermally or electrochemically) without changes to the timing 
of the service gained from use of energy. Examples of energy services that can benefit from 
storage include electric vehicle charging, hot water tank heating, and short term switching 
of refrigeration and air conditioning, as well as the long established option of storage 
heating. In principle, individual decisions to switch-on or switch-off these technologies can 
be made without direct reference to the consumer, either by a supplier/aggregator (direct 
load switching) or a smart device. Informed consent remains critically important, and this 
requires higher levels of engagement with energy and higher levels of trust in the energy 
industry than the current norm. Without this the option of more simple tariffs at slightly 
higher cost will remain more attractive. In the short term at least, we expect these factors to 
be more limiting than the technical potential, which is clearly very large. 
Various academic studies ² such as that on electricity system flexibility produced for the 
Committee on Climate Change or the National Infrastructure Commission - have quoted 
large numbers in respect of potential savings arising from flexibility, including from flexible 
demand. However, many academic studies need to make significant assumptions and these 
are rarely fully substantiated. Technical potentials for demand side flexibility are often 
                                           





included, but without an assessment of how much of that potential can be realised in 
practice, once social and economic constraints have been taken into account. The overall 
realisable potential for demand flexibility, both DSM and DSR, is still to be determined. 
Some useful initial discussion on this can be found in, for example, a report produced by 
Sustainability First and published in April 2015 - ´*%HOHFWULFLW\GHPDQG² realising the 
UHVRXUFHµ² DQGLQUHVSHFWRIWKHGRPHVWLFVHFWRU´)XUWKHU$QDO\VLVRIWKH+RXVHKROG
EOHFWULFLW\6XUYH\(DUO\)LQGLQJV'HPDQGVLGHPDQDJHPHQWµE\&DPEULGJH$UFKLWHFWXUDO
Research Ltd, Element Energy & Loughborough University from November 2013. 
We believe that two keys to realising the potential of flexible demand are as follows: 
1. making it as easy as possible for electricity consumers to control or schedule their 
use of electricity, or to have the confidence in service providers who can do so on 
their behalf; ; 
2. maximising the share of the benefits of demand flexibility that accrue to electricity 
consumers. 
Both of the above are likely to depend on parties other than the household consumer. 
&RPPHUFLDOSURGXFWVHJ¶KRPHHQHUJ\PDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPV·PLJKWEHFRPHDYDLODEOH
that consumers can buy and use such that their electricity consumption becomes, unlike 
ZKDWLVRIIHUHGE\¶·VPDUWPHWHUVµ45JHQXLQHO\¶VPDUW·+RZHYHUWKHILQDQFLDOEHQHILWV
depend on what contractual arrangements consumers have for the supply of their energy. 
This, in turn, depends on a plethora of parties and services in the wider electricity sector. 
The aforementioned report by Sustainability First discusses some of these which we 
summarise in Table 1 below in respect of potential co-parties to different demand side 
contracts, the envisaged benefits to the co-parties and existing mechanisms. 
Table 1- potential co-parties to flexible demand contracts 
-party Benefit to co-party Scheme 
System operator 
(SO) 
 Frequency response 
 Reserve 
 Enhanced frequency response 
 Short-term operating reserve 
(STOR) 




 Defer or avoid network 
reinforcement to meet peak 
power flow 
 Use of system charging 
 Faster access for new connections 
 Payment through innovation 









 Defer or avoid network 
reinforcement to meet peak 
power flow 
 Use of system charging 
 Faster access for new connections 
Supplier/retailer  Help manage wholesale 
procurement risk 
 Offer services to SO 
 Variable half-hourly pricing 
 Economy 7 / Economy 10 
 Voluntary load management 
Aggregator  Help manage wholesale 
procurement risk 
 Offer services to SO 
 Variable half-hourly pricing 
 Voluntary load management 
Capacity market  Reduced need for generation 
capacity 
 Capacity market 
 
Demand side aspects of the Capacity Market and what the System Operator buys are slowly 
becoming better developed. A number of aggregators are already active in procuring, 
offering and managing demand side services but, as is discussed in the Ofgem/BEIS Call for 
Evidence, there are a number of regulatory questions concerning their status. In respect of 
DNOs, TOs and suppliers/retailers, there is much room for improvement. However, it may 
also be noted that, given the existing electricity system infrastructure and the costs of 
system balancing, the magnitude of potential financial benefits to electricity users is 
currently limited or perceived to be so. As the Call for Evidence QRWHVWKHUHLV´DSHUFHSWLRQ
among suppliers and intermediaries that the value created through consumer response to 
smart tariffs is insufficient to be worth pursuing for consumers other than the largest users 
HJGXHWROLPLWHGZKROHVDOHSULFHGLIIHUHQWLDOVµDQGWKHUHDUH´WUDGH-offs between reducing 
the cost-to-VHUYHDQGUDLVLQJVXSSOLHUV·FRVWVRIELOODGPLQLVWUDWLRQµ. Nonetheless, as we 
discuss below in our answer to question 15, we believe that the big suppliers are, at 
present, serving customers poorly. 
The benefits that can be expected when demand for electricity grows for the charging of 
electric vehicles, or to provide more electric space and storage heating, should be 
substantially larger than those perceived at present, though there is still a need to keep 
administration costs to a minimum. A healthy, competitive market will be essential to 
keeping those costs down. 
 To what extent do you believe Government and Ofgem should play a role in promoting 
smart tariffs or enabling new business models in this area? Please provide a rationale for 
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your answer, and, if you feel Government and Ofgem should play a role, examples of the 
sort of interventions which might be helpful. 
7KHUROORXWRI¶VPDUW·PHWHUVDQGVPDUWV\VWHPVJHQHUDOO\VKRXOGEHVHHQDVDIDFLOLWDWRURI
informed consumer decision making, not a substitute for it. We share the doubts expressed 
by many stakeholders about whether licensed suppliers were the best choice to implement 
¶VPDUWPHWHU·UROORXW+RZHYHUWKDWGHFLVLRQKDVEHHQPDGHDQGZHZRXOGQRWVXSSRUW
reversal at this point. Instead, we believe it remains important for the roll out process to 
include engagement with households. This has clear measurable benefits46. Government and 
Ofgem need to continue to require consumers to be informed about smart meters and 
displays at the point of installation. This is a necessary part of the process of smart system 
development, not an unnecessary additional cost burden. If requiring this approach leads to 
a need to extend the smart meter roll out timetable, that would be preferable to a roll out 
that bypasses consumer engagement. 
What the Call for Evidence FDOOV¶VPDUWWDULIIV·LQSDUWLFXODUWLPH-of-use (ToU) pricing, 
already exists, at least to some extent, and has existed for a number of decades. In respect 
RIVPDOOHUFRQVXPHUVWKHPRVWSHUWLQHQWDUH¶(FRQRP\·DQG¶(FRQRP\·7KHLURULJLQDO
purpose was to encourage electricity use at times of low demand and, as a consequence, 
help to reduce electricity unit commitment and despatch costs. Although growth of solar PV 
DQGZLQGKDYHUHVXOWHGLQJUHDWHUYDULDELOLW\RI¶QHW·RU¶UHVLGXDO·GHPDQGLHWKDWwhich 
remains to be served after utilisation of available weather-dependent renewables, demand 
overnight is still low and the original motivation for these tariffs is still material. However, as 
noted by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) review of the energy markets, 
consumers are actually penalised ² not rewarded ² by the biggest suppliers for being on 
these tariffs. As far as we are aware, the CMA failed to come up with any significant reason 
why. However, we note that a number aggregators and smaller retailers/suppliers have 
H[SUHVVHGWKHYLHZWKDWWKHGRPLQDQFHRIWKHUHWDLOVXSSO\PDUNHWVE\¶WKHELJ·DQGWKHLU
vertical integration with generation interests significantly impacts on the offering of 
attractive ToU tariffs. This, they argue, is because greater participation by the demand side 
in system balancing would take business away from their generation interests. 
The main immediate role that we see Government and Ofgem playing is to address reasons 
ZK\H[LVWLQJ¶VPDUWWDULIIV·IRUVPDOOHUconsumers provide no benefits to consumers. Our 
view is that vertical integration of retail/supply and generation is likely to be significantly 
and adversely impacting on the offering of benefits of so-FDOOHG¶VPDUWWDULIIV·WR
consumers. Although the CMA asserted that there was no evidence of vertical integration 
                                           
46 See Darby, S.J., Liddell, C., Hills, D., Drabble, D., 2015. Smart metering early learning 
project: synthesis report. Department of Energy and Climate Change, London. 
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having an adverse impact on consumers as a whole, we are not convinced that the analysis 
was robust with respect to the RIIHULQJRI¶VPDUWWDULIIV· 
Given the growing variability of wholesale market and flexibility costs, we believe that 
Government and Ofgem should require the use of half-hourly settlement wherever possible. 
We therefore support the announced plan to do this. We agree that the set of issues 
identified in paragraph 9 of the Call for Evidence needs to be addressed. We recognise that 
there is not a simplistic link between the settlement process and supplier tariff structures 
DQGWKDWVXSSOLHUVZLOOQRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\UROORXW¶VPDUW·WDULIIs because of the issues set out 
above. However, placing the costs and benefits of monitoring and management of consumer 
load profiles more clearly on individual suppliers provides an incentive that does not exist 
with the existing approach of using sets of standard load profiles. 
Below, e.g. in the answer to Q23 and in our responses to the questions posed in chapter 5 
of the Call for Evidence, we discuss interactions between transmission and distribution and 
lessons that can be learned from experiences with transmission system commercial and 
regulatory arrangements and how they are reformed.  
To some extent, the main distinction between transmission and distribution, i.e. the 
nominal network voltages that are labelled as one or the other, is arbitrary. However, some 
other differences can be observed. These include the tendency, at least historically, for 
generation developments to exploit economies of scale and therefore to connect at 
transmission voltages. It is similar economies of scale ² both amount of power and distance 
² that drove the development of high voltage network capacity in the first place and the 
consequential high impact of single faults that led to the meshed configuration of 
transmission. Largely as a consequence of that, the concepts associated with optimal, 
¶DFWLYH·PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHSRZHUV\VWHPLHV\VWHPRSHUDWLRQKDYHDOZD\VEHHQXVHGDW
transmission levels but, to the extent that they were ever used at distribution levels, many 
were forgotten about by distribution utilities decades ago. The historic concentration of 
influences on the transmission system in the hands of relatively few actors each of which 
were responsible for large volumes of energy has, compared with distribution, arguably led 
to more active participation in working groups concerned with various transmission codes 
and more active development of those codes. However, even then, progress to address 
HPHUJLQJLVVXHVKDVRIWHQEHHQSDLQIXOO\VORZ2QHH[DPSOHZDV¶3URMHFW7UDQVPL7·ZKLFK
took more than 5 years to implement a relatively minor change to Transmission Network 
Use of System Charging arrangements47.  
                                           
47 The change that was finally implemented in April 2016 was certainly minor relative to 
that advocated by some academic contributors to the project, i.e. fundamental change of the 
wholesale market to adopt LMP. 
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Perhaps the single most important reason why there has been more active engagement in 
transmission arrangements is that each party stands to gain ² or to lose ² so much that it 
can justify the devotion of fairly significant resources to each working group. For example, if 
the reward or the penalty to a single party for some particular change is a few million 
pounds per year, it will be worth that party committing a few people to working full-time on 
the working group. One reason why changes are so slow is that each change results in both 
winners and losers, and the losers will sometimes do their best to block the change 
regardless of what is best for the system (or consumers) as a whole. On the other hand, the 
issues have also often been big enough for Ofgem to pay close attention to each one and to 
lean on the NETSO to provide what Ofgem wants to see as independent leadership to the 
processes. This is, in our view, in stark contrast to reforms of arrangements relating to 
distribution. These ² whether associated with engineering standards or charging 
arrangements ² have largely been left to the DNOs, represented through the Energy 
Networks Association (ENA) and the impresVLRQZHKDYHLVWKDW2IJHP·VHQJDJHPHQWKDV
been almost entirely passive. In addition, the DNOs have, through the various innovation 
IXQGVUHTXLUHGWKHFDUURWRIVLJQLILFDQWVXPVRIWKHLUFXVWRPHUV·PRQH\WRHQJDJHZLWKWKH
major changes now happening on the electricity system and find new, better ways of 
managing the system48. To date, their use of those funds has been more concerned with 
new bits of kit than with methods or processes, including codes and standards, for 
managing the system49. 
One example of WKH'12V·VORZQHVVLQXSGDWLQJWKHLUPHWKRGVUHODWHVWRWKHLUPDLQORDG-
related investment planning standard, Engineering Recommendation (ER) P2. As the 
Ofgem/BEIS flexibility Call for Evidence QRWHV´PXFKQHWZRUNUHLQIRUFHPHQWLVGHFLGHG
according to forecast peak load, which is dependent on the likelihood of network capacity 
EHLQJXVHGDWWKHVDPHSHDNWLPHµ+RZHYHULWKDVEHHQDUJXHGE\RQHRIWKHDXWKRUVRI
this response that (a) a focus on a very sharp peak associated with neglect of operational 
measures and (b) inconsistent approaches to the task by different DNO engineers can lead 
to sub-optimal solutions and this, in turn, could have been addressed by some relatively 
                                           
48 The DNOs are likely to argue, perhaps fairly, that their historic price review settlements 
JDYHWKHPOLWWOHRUQRLQFHQWLYHWRGRDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQFRQGXFWHVWDEOLVKHG¶EXVLQHVVDV
XVXDO· at ever lower costs and that they have succeeded in doing just that. 
49 See D. Frame, K. Bell and S. McArthur, A Review and Synthesis of the Outcomes from Low 





simple changes to ER P2 at the time of the last revision (from ER P2/5 to ER P2/6) regardless 
of the fundamental review led by the ENA that is now inching slowly forwards50. 
)RUXVRQHNH\OHVVRQLQUHVSHFWRIWKH'12V·DQGRQWKHLUEHKDOIWKH(1$·VOHDGHUVKLSWR
date of innovation of methods, processes, standards and codes is that the reforms that we 
believe are now required cannot be left to them to take forward. One particular point to note 
is that the ENA is not a disinterested body; rather, it is, in effect, a trade body whose role is 
to represent the interests of network companies. Given their greater experience with many 
of the relevant issues and in the leadership of industry working groups, it might be argued 
that the NETSO should assume a leadership role. However, it, too, will be open to the same 
criticism of lack of independence as the ENA. In the absence of any other suitable body, 
leadership would seem to fall to Ofgem as the independent industry regulator. 
 If deemed appropriate, when would it be most sensible for Government/Ofgem to take 
any further action to drive the market (i.e. what are the relevant trigger points for 
determining whether to take action)? Please provide a rationale for your answer. 
We currently lack relevant information to say exactly when which action should be taken. 
+RZHYHUZHQRWHWKDW2IJHP·Vpromise to review progress on transmission-distribution 
interaction issues in late 2017 suggests that it is being left to the network licensees to lead 
work. Although Ofgem might argue, perhaps with reason, that it lacks the knowledge to 
take a more active part, we believe that this is much too passive and risks excessive delays 
in proposals for change being formed and tested. 
 What relevant evidence is there from other countries that we should take into account 
when considering how to encourage the development of smart tariffs? 
The writers of this response are not, themselves, familiar with exact arrangements in other 
countries. However, we note that the following countries are likely to provide to some useful 
lessons: 
x The US where, in the PJM market, for example, the demand side seems to be 
particularly significant. However, we note that introduction of demand side markets 
has not been without its problems (requiring various revisions of arrangements) and 
that many of the services relate to demand in summer months. This is important as 
there is likely to be considerably more flexibility in respect of cooling demand than, 
as would be required in winter, heating demand. 
                                           
50 See K. Bell, A successor to ER P2/6: existing issues and lessons from "Flexible Networks 





x France, where a significant proportion of demand for heat is met by the electricity 
system, where much of the generation fleet has limited flexibility and where many 
electricity consumers are already on ToU tariffs with some degree of direct control of 
load. 
x The island of Ireland, where the penetration of renewables is proportionally higher 
than that in Britain and where system balancing issues are comparable to those in 
Britain. 
x Germany where, in the retail market, switching of suppliers must already be effected 
in 5 days or less. This is significant because effective competition among suppliers 
will be critical to tariff innovation and ease of switching is fundamental to effective 
competition. 
 
 Do you recognise the reasons we have identified for why suppliers may not offer or why 
larger non-domestic consumers may not take up, smart tariffs? If so, please provide 
details, especially if you have experienced them. Have we missed any?  
We do recognise what the Call for Evidence VD\VLQUHVSHFWRI´DSHUFHSWLRQDPRQJVXSSOLHUV
and intermediaries that the value created through consumer response to smart tariffs is 
insufficient to be worth pursuing for consumers other than the largest users e.g. due to 
OLPLWHGZKROHVDOHSULFHGLIIHUHQWLDOVµDQG´WUDGH-offs between reducing the cost-to-serve 
DQGUDLVLQJVXSSOLHUV·FRVWVRIELOODGPLQLVWUDWLRQµ+RZever, we note that the roll-out of an 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI, i.e. so-FDOOHG¶VPDUWPHWHUV·VKRXOGVLJQLILFDQWO\
UHGXFHVXSSOLHUV·H[FXVHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRDGPLQLVWUDWLRQFRVWV0RUHRYHU$0,VKRXOGDOVR
reduce the time taken to switch suppliers and enhance confidence in correct billing either 
VLGHRIWKHVZLWFK2IJHPDQG%(,6VKRXOGPRQLWRUWKHVXSSOLHUV·SULFHVDQGRIIHULQJVYHU\
carefully as AMI is implemented.  
We also draw attention to our response to Question 15. 
3.2 Smart Distribution Tariffs - Incremental Change  
 
 Are distribution charges currently acting as a barrier to the development of a more 
flexible system? Please provide details, including experiences/case studies where 
relevant.  
 
 What are the incremental changes that could be made to distribution charges to 
overcome any barriers you have identified, and to better enable flexibility?  
 
 How problematic and urgent are any disparities between the treatment of different types 




they add no network cost and only net demand.  
 
 Do you anticipate that underlying network cost drivers are likely to substantively change 
as the use of the distribution network changes? If so, in what way and how should DUoS 
charges change as a result?  
The development of distributed generation (DG) is already impacting significantly on the 
power system in Britain. Simplistic arrangements that treat DG always and only as reducing 
demand and, as a consequence, reducing the need for network capacity are inadequate 
EHFDXVHGHSHQGLQJRQWKH'*·VORFDWLRQLWVSUHVHQFHFDQOHDGWRLQFUHDVHGSRZHUIORZV,Q
addition, without adequate management, DG can result in problems with excessively high 
voltages. 
Until very much more demand is flexible than it is at present, DG will be much more 
controllable than demand. Moreover, because of the wide range of different influences on 
the location of demand, it is likely to be much more effective to use price signals to 
influence the location of new generation than it is to influence the location of demand. 
Price or use of system charging signals can and should be used to incentivise DG to connect 
at locations where the adverse impacts on the network are minimal. However, at some point, 
it is likely that adverse impacts, such as a need for active management (meaning some 
curtailment) of generation or network reinforcement are necessary and, as we discuss in our 
responses to the questions raised in chapter 5 of the Call for Evidence, incentives on DNOs 
to carry out the most economically efficient actions will be critical.  
 Network charges can send both short term signals to support efficient operation and 
flexibility needs in close to real time as well as longer term signals relating to new 
investments, and connections to, the distribution network. Can DUoS charges send both 
short term and long term signals at the same time effectively? Should they do so? And if 
so, how? 
The questions posed here and in paragraphs 18-23 of the Call for Evidence are highly 
relevant but have insufficient scope in that they relate not only to distribution but also to 
transmission charging and signals.  
An oversight in GB electricity supply industry developments since liberalisation has been the 
neglect of interactions between transmission and distribution, and the failure to see the 
electricity infrastructure as part of one system, regardless of voltage level. This oversight 
has arguably not had a major impact until the last few years when DG has grown 
significantly. Now, as well as appropriate signals to location within either a distribution or a 
transmission network and to temporal behaviour, there should be signals which adequately 
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reflect the relative costs of connection and utilisation of generation (and storage and, to the 
extent that it can respond to signals, demand) at different voltage levels, and these signals 
should reflect, as far as possible, whole electricity system costs51. In our view, this points to 
a need for a quite fundamental review of charging arrangements across distribution and 
transmission, and not just to tinkering with distribution arrangements. (See our answers to 
the questions raised in chapter 5 of the Call for Evidence for discussion of the potential 
impacts of failing to resolve interactions between transmission and distribution). Regardless 
of exactly how roles and responsibilities are attributed to different network licensees (see 
section 5 of the Call for Evidence and our responses) and connected parties, it will be 
important to have a common set of high level principles that apply across the power system 
regardless of location and voltage level, and a consistent set of standards and codes in 
respect of energy trading and retail, system access and connections, network investment 
and maintenance, system operation, and system resilience52. The standards and codes 
should take due account of scale and spatial and temporal interactions. 
Correct incentives in respect of network infrastructure and system balancing costs have, to 
date, received considerably more attention in a transmission context than in distribution. 
Many of the issues will be similar and debates in respect of transmission can help to inform 
discussion of distribution pricing and charges. Among the issues that is debated from time-
to-time is whether the GB wholesale market should be fundamentally reformed to adopt 
real-time locational marginal pricing (LMP). Locational prices vary in time reflecting the fact 
that total demand, the availability of power from different sources and transfers of power 
across the network vary through the year and, in general, network limits are only reached 
from time to time. According to its proponents, the short-term operational signals succeed 
also in providing long-term investment signals to network owners, generators, potential 
owners and operators of storage and the demand side. In some jurisdictions, e.g. New York 
state, consideration is being given to extending these arrangements down to distribution 
voltages. 
In our view, there are some theoretical attractions to real-time locational pricing. However, 
the practical issues should be carefully thought through before adopting LMP. These include 
the quality of system modelling, the success ² or otherwise ² in providing correct and timely 
signals to investment and the ability of smaller parties to manage the uncertainties and 
                                           
51 An example of a whole system impact relates to connection of generation to a 
distribution network that sits within a net exporting transmission zone. Connection and 
operation of any generation within that zone, whether transmission or distribution 
connected, leads to increased exports from that zone. On the other hand, operation of new 
DG within an importing transmission zone reduces the level of import. 
52 ¶5HVLOLHQFH·LQFOXGHVWKHFRQWDLQPHQWRIDQGUHFRYHU\IURPGLVWXUEDQFHVQRWMXVW
prevention of adverse impact. 
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associated risks, whether they will therefore be dependent on 3rd parties, e.g. suppliers or 
DJJUHJDWRUVWRPDQDJHWKHPIRUWKHPDQGZKHWKHU¶WKHPDUNHW·FDQEHUHOLHGRQWR
incentivise good, cost-effective performance by these 3rd parties. 
 In the context of the DSO transition and the models set out in Chapter 5 we would be 
interested to understand your views of the interaction between potential distribution 
charges and this thinking.  
See our answers to questions 22 and 23. 
3.3 Other Government Policies  
 Can you provide evidence to show how existing Government policies can help or hinder 
the transition to a smart energy future?  
 
 What changes to CM application/verification processes could reduce barriers to 
flexibility in the near term, and what longer term evolutions within/alongside the CM 
might be needed to enable newer forms of flexibility (such as storage and DSR) to 
contribute in light of future smart system developments?  
 
 Do you have any evidence to support measures that would best incentivise renewable 
generation, but fully account for the costs and benefits of distributed generation on a 




4 A system for the consumer  
In this section, we provide some responses to the questions about consumer protection and 
cyber-security (Qs39-42). We have made some comments on domestic and small non-
domestic energy users elsewhere in our response, in particular in our general comments in 
section 1 and in section 3. 
4.1 Smart appliances 
 
 Do you agree with the 4 principles for smart appliances set out above (interoperability, 
data privacy, grid security, energy consumption)? Yes/No (please explain)  
 
 What evidence do you have in favour of or against any of the options set out to 
incentivise/ensure that these principles are followed? Please select below which options 
you would like to submit evidence for, specify if these relate to a particular sector(s), and 
use the text box/attachments to provide your evidence.  
 Option A: Smart appliance labelling  
 Option B: Regulate smart appliances  
 Option C: Require appliances to be smart  
 Other/none of the above (please explain why)  
 
 Do you have any evidence to support actions focused on any particular category of 
appliance? Please select below which category or categories of appliances you would like 
to submit evidence for, and use the text box/attachments to provide your evidence:  
 Wet appliances (dishwashers, washing machines, washer-dryers, tumble dryers)  
 Cold appliances (refrigeration units, freezers)  
 Heating, ventilation and air conditioning  
 Battery storage systems  
 Others (please specify)  
 
 Are there any other barriers or risks to the uptake of smart appliances in addition to 
those already identified?  
 
 Are there any other options that we should be considering with regards to mitigating 
potential risks, in particular with relation to vulnerable consumers?  
4.2 Ultra-low emission vehicles 
 
 How might Government and industry best engage electric vehicle users to promote 




 What barriers are there for vehicle and electricity system participants (e.g. vehicle 
manufacturers, aggregators, energy suppliers, network and system operators) to 
develop consumer propositions for the:  
 control or shift of electricity consumption during vehicle charging; or  
 utilisation of an electric vehicle battery for putting electricity back into homes, 
businesses or the network?  
 
 What barriers (regulatory or otherwise) are there to the use of hydrogen water 
electrolysis as a renewable energy storage medium?  
4.3 Consumer Engagement with DSR  
 
 Can you provide any evidence demonstrating how large n -domestic consumers 
currently find out about and provide DSR services?  
 
 Do you recognise the barriers we have identified to large non-domestic customers 
providing DSR? Can you provide evidence of additional barriers that we have not 
identified?  
 
 Do you think that existing initiatives are the best way to engage large non-domestic 
consumers with DSR? If not, what else do you think we should be doing?  
 
 When does engaging/informing domestic and smaller non-domestic consumers about 
the transition to a smarter energy system become a top priority and why (i.e. in terms of 
trigger points)?  
 
4.4 Consumer Protection and Cyber Security  
Our responses to the questions 41 and 42 have been led by James Irvine and Greig Paul of 
the University of Strathclyde. 
 Please provide views on what interventions might be necessary to ensure consumer 
protection in the following areas:  
 Social impacts  
 Data and privacy  
 Informed consumers  
 Preventing abuses  
 Other  
 
 Can you provide evidence demonstrating how smart technologies (domestic or 
industrial/commercial) could compromise the energy system and how likely this is?  
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Smart technologies could compromise the energy system in two ways ² firstly through direct 
control or actuation, and secondly through indirect actions which can be used to influence 
or affect the power system. 
Direct control of equipment which is improperly exposed on the internet presents a 
significant risk ² Shodan (a search engine for internet connected equipment) indicates that 
there are 320 MODBUS devices currently exposed to the internet in the UK53, including 
Telemecanique programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Legacy protocols such as these are 
not intended for connection to public networks, and do not feature any security, 
authentication or access control ² anyone with access to the system may connect and 
directly interact with the equipment. 
Improperly secured domestic devices can be rapidly taken over by attackers, as seen 
recently, e.g. distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks due to the Miral botnet on internet 
of things (IoT) devices with default passwords. If these devices permit the control of loads 
within the home, this could give a single attacker control of a wide range of loads on the 
network54. Similar weaknesses have recently been reported built-in on devices with heating 
elements55. Were an attacker to switch a large number of such domestic devices within a 
short period of time, this would compromise power system integrity. 
 What risks would you highlight in the context of securing the energy system? Please 
provide evidence on the current likelihood and impact.  
Current risks can be considered to fall into one of the following areas: inserting or changing 
command signals to directly control equipment on the power network; blocking command 
signals to prevent control of the network; inserting or modifying sensor data to cause the 
legitimate network control systems to take inappropriate action; blocking sensor data to 
blind the network; or interacting with interconnected networks which may have knock on 
effects on the power network (such as home automation devices or public 
telecommunication networks). Often, parts of the network which would seem of lower 
importance on their own can, in aggregate, become critical.  For example, the security of an 
                                           
53 MODBUS is a serial communications protocol originally published in 1979 for use with 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs). According to Drury, Bill (2009). Control Techniques 
Drives and Controls Handbook, (2nd ed.). Institution of Engineering and Technology, it is 









individual smart meter is not of great concern beyond an individual subscriber, but GCHQ 
recently had to intervene to require improved security since there may be a potential 
vulnerability that could affect all smart meters. That would have been a serious issue56.  
Often, a determined attacker will use several of the above approaches.  This could be seen 
with the attack on the power system in Ukraine which was months in the planning, with 
original phishing emails sent to employees many weeks before the actual attack to allow 
hackers to build a picture of the network and control systems. Employees at three utilities 
were then locked out of their systems while circuit breakers were opened to disrupt supply, 
with the firmware on the communications modules previously re-programmed to prevent 
remote access from being used to close the breakers again. This caused the actual outage. 
Two main control rooms also had their uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems attacked, 
to ensure that the grid operators would have no visibility or control of their network through 
XVXDOV\VWHPVFDXVLQJIXUWKHUFKDOOHQJHVLQEULQJLQJWKHJULGEDFNXS7KHXWLOLWLHV·FDOO
centres were also attacked to prevent customers from reporting faults57. 
Another major risk is in the quality and security of software used ² research has found a 
wide range of vulnerabilities within most systems, from firewalls and virtual private network 
(VPN) units (used to control and protect telecommunications networks) by Juniper58, Cisco59, 
Fortinet60 and others, through to the industrial control systems themselves61. These kinds of 
vulnerabilities throw into question the security assumptions made by operators of energy 
networks, where it is assumed that firewalls and other networking equipment are secure, 
and that VPN systems used will prevent unauthorised parties from entering. With VPNs 
widely used for remote site administration and access, this presents a major risk, especially 
when, in order to avoid outages or loss of access, energy network users do not routinely 
update the software on these devices. 
A final risk is around the application of policies and procedures ² network operators have a 
variety of information available to them from the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI), the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and other sources such as 











61 See https://www.wired.com/2013/10/ics/  
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the Energy Networks Association (ENA), but these guidelines are typically designed at a high 
level, for management use, focused on the building of policy. There is very little information 
available for practitioners to refer to and implement, in order to ensure the practical security 
of the systems they deploy, for example, in setting up a VPN in the field, and to ensure the 
security assumptions they make are valid and acceptable. There is also a major risk caused 
by the conflict between availability and security.  While in the IT space, confidentiality is the 
priority, followed by integrity and finally availability, in the industrial control sector the 
priorities are reversed: availability first, then integrity, then confidentiality. Afraid of 
outages, providers often do not wish to enforce strong security policies that might result in 
a false-positive causing a loss of service. This extends to a general attitude of not patching 
working systems. Combined with lack of visibility of the installed equipment-base, this 
leads to widespread use of outdated, unpatched systems within substations and other 





5 The roles of different parties in the system and network 
operation  
 
 Do you agree with the emerging system requirements we have identified (set out in 
Figure 1)? Are any missing?  
In our view, the drivers for change are broadly correct.  
We would be inclined to add the following to the list of requirements: 
x Openness to innovation. Given the content of Chapter 6, this is clearly the intention, 
but it is not immediately evident from this diagram. 
x Governance arrangements that facilitate broader consumer engagement. The 
complexity of some of the issues should not be allowed to obscure the need for 
greater consumer engagement and accountability.  
x Tariff structures appropriate to consumers. Some of the other emerging 
requirements might be read to imply that the aim is simply to produce cost reflective 
prices for all system users. There is a broad recognition that highly complex tariffs 
for all household users is not a realistic objective. Of course, simplified tariffs may 
make the delivery of other emerging requirements more difficult, but we believe that 
the implications of complexity should be recognised at the outset. 
Based on the analysis in the Call for Evidence itself and other parts of this response we think 
it would be helpful to add the following to the list of drivers for system change: 
x Storage, meaning two-way storage (capable of converting to and from electrical 
HQHUJ\ZKLFKSURYLGHVDPHDQVRIDGGUHVVLQJYDULDEOH¶QHWGHPDQG·EXWDOVR
represents a potential alternative to network capacity or a complement to it. The 
costs of various technologies are falling and performance improving so it is clearly 
RQHRIWKH´QHZIOH[LEOHWHFKQRORJLHVµDQGPD\ZDUUDQWH[SOLFLWUHFRJQLWLRQ 
Another factor that might be regarded as a driver for change is the growth of interest in 
´lRFDOHQHUJ\V\VWHPVµthat are currently seen by many, primarily outside the electricity 
industry, as desirable, not least as a way of overcoming what are seen as barriers to 
connection of DER. There is a risk, currently attracting much attention in, for example, the 
US and Australia, that distribution use of system charging based on annual energy transfers 
rather maximum power exchanges risks either under-recovery of network costs or placing 
an excessive cost burden on distribution network users that lack the means to reduce their 
import of electricity from the network. This danger seems to be recognised by Ofgem and 
BEIS in the discussion presented in paragraphs 15-23 of the Call for Evidence. However, 
´ORFDOHQHUJ\V\VWHPVµDOVRSUHVHQWDQRSSRUWXQLW\,IWKH\FDQEHRSHUDWHGLQVXch a way as 
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to cap the import from or export to the network62, they can contribute to the minimisation 
of network costs. Furthermore, they would represent another layer in the hierarchical 
approach to system operation we mention in our discussion of different models of 
interaction between transmission and distribution in our response to Q46. However, in order 
that whole electricity system costs can be minimised, it will be important that the 
characteristics of each ´local energy systemµ are appropriately defined, e.g. any voltage or 
frequency dependency of the net transfer. There is also a need for developers of such local 
energy systems to be adequately informed on the costs and benefits of different network 
access options63. 
One further key element is perhaps missing: there are many possible ways of addressing the 
challenges presented, above all, by the very different patterns of generation emerging 
compared with what we had in the past. Large, schedulable, fossil-fuelled generating units 
are being replaced ² partly by many weather-dependent, small generators, notably wind and 
solar. Their variability and the uncertainty of output plus rules that do not currently mandate 
monitoring for the smallest installations make system operation ² the minute-by-minute 
balancing of generation and demand and the respect of network limits ² very challenging. 
Appropriate pricing of services delivered and services used should be fair in taking into 
account both the contribution technologies make towards supporting flexibility and security 
and any consequential costs (e.g. for system balancing). 
In principle, flexible demand can be an important, cost-effective tool in helping to manage 
the system. However, exactly how to encourage and utilise flexibility on the demand side is 
an open question. As we discussed in our responses to the questions posed in chapter 3 of 
the Call for Evidence, some mechanisms ² ¶LQGLUHFWFRQWURO·² rely on incentives such as price 
signals but leave an element of uncertainty as to the responses to those signals; others ² 
¶GLUHFWFRQWURO·² give greater certainty but are likely to be less attractive to the majority of 
energy users. As the various mechanisms get rolled out and before they become well-
established and characterised, uncertainty regarding the daily variability of demand will 
grow. There is also uncertainty regarding the underlying level of demand for electricity 
associated with possible growth for, for example, electric vehicle charging and more electric 
heating.  
                                           
62 Paragraph 22 of the call for evidence mentions one way in which this might be achieved. 
63 This need is common to developers of any DER and represents a particular challenge in 
light of the small scale of developments and what is often a lack of prior knowledge on the 
part of the developers. We feel that DNOs can and should do more to help inform 
connection applicants. However, we also believe that it would be reasonable for DNOs to 
recover at least some of the cost of such support from applicants. 
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In simple terms, one manifestation of the main goal in accommodating future generation 
and demand is an objective to maximise the utilisation (across each year of operation) of 
electricity system assets, i.e. generators, network components and storage facilities. 
Arising from the increased diffusion of distributed energy resources (DER), another omission 
from the drivers is the need for improved coordination between the National Electricity 
Transmission System Operator (NETSO) and distribution network operators (DNOs). 
Although new social, legal or commercial arrangements and improved monitoring down at 
lower voltages might not be strictly necessary to meet the growing challenges, in our view 
they are very likely to be critical to doing so at least total cost. 
,QUHVSHFWRI¶HPHUJLQJV\VWHPUHTXLUHPHQWV·WKHV\VWHPUHTXLUHPHQWVOLVWHGLQ)LJXUHRI
the Call for Evidence DUHQRWMXVW¶HPHUJLQJ·EXWKDYHDOZD\VEHHQWKHUH,IWKDWLVWKHFDVH
one might ask where the need for change comes from. As we noted earlier in our answer to 
this question, we believe it comes from changing generation patterns, in particular the 
increasing contribution from weather-dependent renewables and an increased number of 
smaller generators, many of which are distribution connected; the possible growth of 
demand for electricity to charge electric vehicles and to decarbonise some part of the 
demand for heat; and the need to accommodate those changes at least cost. This implies 
the active monitoring and control of a great many more connections to the power system, at 
all voltage levels, than are actively managed at present. Present day arrangements, in 
particular the fact that only the transmission network licensees have the established means 
in terms of facilities, processes and expertise to actively operate their systems and not just 
(as in the case of most current DNO practice) to respond to faults or to adopt isolated, 
VLPSOHH[DPSOHVRIDXWRPDWHG¶DFWLYHQHWZRUNPDQDJHPHQW·$10DWEHVWULVNDJUHDWGHDO
of inefficiency in meeting future needs and, at worst, system instability and blackout64. New 
technologies need not be viewed solely as drivers of change; they can also be regarded 
potential contributors towards meeting emerging requirements. However, except where 
there is a clear need for demonstration and testing and where positive outcomes from such 
tests would allow appropriate future deployment to contribute to meeting system needs at 
least cost, new technology should not be deployed simply for its own sake and 
responsibilities for its ownership and operation should be clearly defined. 
One might question whether all parties need to have visibility of existing and future network 
RUZKDW´DSSURSULDWHYLVLELOLW\µPHDQV7KHUHLV much to be debated regarding which parties 
have visibility of how much. However, as a minimum, either the NETSO or operators of 
distribution networks need to have greater observability and controllability in respect of DER 
than they have now. 
                                           





 Do you have any data which illustrates:  
 the current scale and cost of the system impacts described in table 7, and how these 
might change in the future?  
 the potential efficiency savings which could be achieved, now and in the future, 
through a more co-ordinated approach to managing these impacts?  
We first make some observations on what is listed in Table 7 of the Call for Evidence. 
x More accurately, growth of distributed generation (DG) and technologies such as 
heat pumps or electric vehicles, do not lead to reduced network capacity but to 
reduced network capacity headroom or margin, the extent of which depends on 
location. Co-location of demand and generation is not, in itself, innovative but there 
are questions about how it is incentivised and how the different characteristics of 
generatioQGHPDQGDQGVWRUDJH¶EHKLQG·DPHWHUFDQVWLOOEHUHFRJQLVHGVXFKWKDW
the dynamic behaviour of the system as a whole can be modelled with sufficient 
accuracy. 
x It is true that growth of DG can have adverse impacts on transmission. One example 
is, arguably (though with limited evidence, see below), in respect of high voltage 
issues. Another is in respect of transmission regions that are already net exporting 
and which, due to connection of DG, become even more net exporting. One general 
issue is simple lack of visibility of operational conditions down in the distribution 
networks. 
x ,Q7DEOHLWLVVWDWHGWKDW´LWLVFULWLFDOWKDWWKHUHDUHDSSURSULDWHGDWDIORZVDQG
coordination of investment planning between parties to mitigate the impact of 
[evolving genHUDWLRQDQGGHPDQGSDWWHUQV@ZKHUHSRVVLEOHµ,QRXURSLQLRQVLPSOH
concrete action to improve the quality of data exchanges between DNOs and 
National Grid is long overdue and should be undertaken regardless of any more 
radical reforms of networks and their regulation or commercial arrangements. As far 
as we understand, the main data exchanges between DNOs and National Grid are 
those required by the Grid Code. For example, schedule 5 of the Data Requirements 
section of the Grid Code requires DNOs to provide information to National Grid on 
forecasted demand (both active and reactive power) at each grid supply point, DG 
and the network characteristics relevant to the estimation of fault levels two voltage 
levels below transmission. As far as we aware, what is provided by most DNOs is very 
limited and, in some cases, inaccurate. For example, demands are provided only in 
respect of local peak and not in respect of year-round variation and have been seen 
to be inaccurate in respect of power factors (with consequences we outline below), 
and the assumptions made in respect of DG operation (which has the effect of 
reducing the net demand seen at a GSP) are not made clear. In our opinion, more 
extensive, clearer and more useful requirements in respect of data provision could 
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be written without too much difficulty and the DNOs should be required to comply 
with them. 
The scale of impacts arising from changes to generation and demand patterns is difficult to 
determine. Quite how much new generation of different types will connect where by when 
and how demand will change by ² say ² 2030, is highly uncertain. The impacts are many ² 
the need for network connections, for enhancement of network thermal capacities, for 
voltage control facilities, for more or faster frequency response and controlled generation or 
demand ramping, for revised system defence measures and for new black start services ² 
and the modelling of them is highly complex65. Very few analysts in Britain have tried to 
quantify the impacts. Two studies of which we are aware are: 
x ´0DQDJLQJ)OH[LELOLW\:KLOVW'HFDUERQLVLQJWKH*%(OHFWULFLW\6\VWHPµSURGXFHGE\WKH
Energy Research Partnership66 which primarily addressed generation dispatch in 
2030 and the potential costs of system inertia constraints or periods with an excess 
of renewable energy; 
x ´9DOXHRIIOH[LELOLW\LQDGHFDUERQLVHGJULGDQGV\VWHPH[WHUQDOLWLHVRIORZ-carbon 
JHQHUDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVµSURGXFHGE\,PSHULDO&ROOHJHDQG1(5$(FRQRPLF
Consulting on behalf of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC)67. 
Both of the above studies use highly simplified system models. The first makes no attempt 
to model network limits or inter-temporal constraints on generation whereas the latter 
does, at least to some extent. Relatively simple models can provide useful insights and are 
an essential first step to understanding where the key issues and sensitivities lie and help to 
better articulate the objectives of further modelling. The first of the above reports is open 
about the assumptions made but the second report, which is similar to analysis by the same 
authors for the National Infrastructure Commission, E3G and Drax, requires careful reading 
to appreciate which factors have been included in the modelling, how that modelling has 
been done and where the data have come from. 
One particular challenge faced by the authors of the above reports, and anyone else 
attempting to develop evidence highlighting the extent of the challenges the power system 
faces or in support of particular interventions, is access to relevant data describing the GB 
power system now from which possible future scenarios can be developed. This is hindered 
                                           
65 For discussion of power system modelling challenges such as in system planning or the 
representation of power electronics, see 
http://www.theiet.org/sectors/energy/resources/modelling-reports/papers.cfm  
66 See http://erpuk.org/project/managing-flexibility-of-the-electricity-sytem/ and a 








connected to the transmission system, where automatic voltage control is or is not used on 
distribution networks and the levels of demand that can be seen at 11kV substations. Lack 
of access to relevant data by parties other than the network licensees places a high 
dependency on studies conducted by the licensees, requires other parties such as academics 
to make assumptions that might not be robust (thus invalidating their findings), prevents 
OLFHQVHHV·ILQGLQJVIURPEHLQJFKDOOHQJHGand hinders innovation.  
In 2014, Workstream 7 of the Smart Grid Forum launched a project ² ´'6µIXQGHG
through the Network Innovation Allowance68 ² aimed at future needs of the distribution 
networks were identified with consideration of both traditional and non-traditional 
UHLQIRUFHPHQWLH¶VPDUW·VROXWLRQVEven though not all of its original objectives were met, 
this project has succeeded in developing some clear and, we believe, useful learning for 
distribution planners and has demonstrated the value of access to models and data 
(discussed further in the Appendix to this response). 
One example of system problems that came as a surprise to the system operator due to 
poor data has been that of high voltages on the transmission network at times of low 
transfers of power from transmission to distribution. It has led to considerable sums of 
money being spent on constraining on transmission connected generation in order that they 
can absorb excess reactive power and to proposals for investment in new shunt reactors 
being formed too late for the normal price review cycle69. 
Normally, the transmission network investment planner would use forecasts of future 
scenarios to make a judgement on whether the system would be operable in compliance 
with the Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) using existing facilities (and what 
the operational cost of such facilities would be) or if there would be economic justification 
for investment in new network facilities. Future demand, both active and reactive power is a 
key dimension of each future scenarios. In practice, we understand that what transmission 
SODQQHUVW\SLFDOO\XVHLVVLPSO\WKH¶QHWGHPDQG·DVVHHQDWWKHLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQ
transmission and distribution, i.e. at the grid supply points (GSPs) and that they depend on 
'12V·VFKHGXOHVXEPLVVLRQVPHQWLRQHGDERYHIRUWKHUHOHYDQWYDOXHVDWHDFKORFDWLRQ
Our understanding is that the investment planners believed that the system would be 
operable in the coming years. However, when the time came, the system operator observed 
                                           
68 See http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=1623#downloads  
69 The result of this is that the associated capex allowance is not part of normal price 
control settlement. A transmission owner must then either fund the investment itself or seek 
DSSURYDOIRUDQ¶LQFRPHDGMXVWPHQWHYHQW·:HXQGHUVWDQGWKDW1DWLRQDO*ULGGLGWKHODWWHU




power demand was significantly lower than expected. This and very low power flows on the 
WUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNUHVXOWHGWKHQHWZRUN·VVKXQWUHDFWLYHSRwer gain being significantly 
higher than the series reactive power loss and, as a consequence, surplus reactive power 
and excessively high voltages. If allowed to persist or get worse, high voltages can lead to 
breakdown of electrical insulation, excessive fault levels or tripping of generation. 
To address reasons why the GSP demands, in particular the reactive power demands, were 
VRORZ1DWLRQDO*ULGLQLWLDWHGD1HWZRUN,QQRYDWLRQ$OORZDQFHSURMHFW¶5($&7·LQ
collaboration with a number of DNOs70. The main findings were, seemingly, that energy 
XVHUV·ORDGVFRQQHFWHGZLWKLQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNXVHOHVVUHDFWLYHSRZHUUHODWLYHWR
active power71 than in the past (not reflected in normal forecasting and data exchange 
processes) and that data exchanges had failed to reflect changes to the distribution 
networks that results in the networks themselves having a lower net consumption of reactive 
power. There were also effects from operation of DG. 
Experience in respect of the changed characteristics of loads and the distribution networks 
and impacts on transmission voltages shows the limitations of current processes. They also 
illustrate the need for improved coordination and data exchange between transmission and 
distribution if the more dramatic changes that many anticipate in respect of DER are not to 
be mismanaged. 
 With regard to the need for immediate action:  
 Do you agree with the proposed roles of DSOs and the need for increased 
coordination between DSOs, the SO and TOs in delivering efficient network planning 
and local/system-wide use of resources?  
 How could industry best carry these activities forward? Do you agree the further 
progress we describe is both necessary and possible over the coming year?  
 Are there any legal or regulatory barriers (e.g. including appropriate incentives), to 
the immediate actions we identify as necessary? If so, please state and prioritise 
them.  
We do not agree with the emphasis of paragraph 12 of the Call for Evidence WKDW´WKHRQXVLV
on industry to address these requiremeQWVLQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHµ7KHVSHHGRIPDQ\RIWKH
changes affecting the power system is a direct or indirect result of Government policy and 
the extent of likely future change is highly dependent on future policy, especially related to 
renewable generation and the electrification of transport and heat. As we note in our answer 
to Q15, we are not confident that the network licensees will drive changes to arrangements 
                                           
70 See http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=1861  
71 That is, the power factor is closer to 1 and the ratio of reactive power (Q) to active power 
(P) is smaller. 
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for the planning and operation of the electricity system at the necessary rate. BEIS and 
Ofgem can and should play a major role in providing clarity and leadership not just on 
system issues, but also on the developments independent of the network licensees that are 
the fundamental drivers of change.  
The Call for Evidence QRWHVWKDW´:HUHFRJQise that [services such as load reduction through 
reduction of distribution network voltages] need to operate on a level playing field with 
other flexibility sources and will continue to monitor arrangements to ensure they work in 
the interests of consumerVµ7KHUHDUHGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVWRD¶OHYHOSOD\LQJILHOG·LQUHVSHFWRI
services. This can mean that services: 
x can be compared in a clear, consistent and fair way; 
x have equal entitlement to fair remuneration. 
Fair remuneration means that reasonable costs can be recovered but should not mean that 
payment is made for services that incur no costs. An example of this is utilisation of the 
inherent capability of generators in such a way that has no impact on ability to sell energy or 
on operating costs, e.g. utilisation of the normal reactive power capability that is available at 
maximum active power output. 
 With regard to further future changes to arrangements:  
 Do you consider that further changes to roles and arrangements are likely to be 
necessary? Please provide reasons. If so, when do you consider they would be 
needed? Why?  
 What are your views on the different models, including:  
 whether the models presented illustrate the right range of potential 
arrangements to act as a basis for further thinking and analysis? Are there any 
other models/trials we should be aware of?  
 which other changes or arrangements might be needed to support the adoption 
of different models?  
iii) do you have any initial thoughts on the potential benefits, costs and risks of the 
models?  
We offer some answers to these questions under five headings: 
x Some initial comments on chapter 5 of the Call for Evidence 
x Actions on distribution networks: asset-based interventions versus operational 
measures 
x Incentives and access to information 
x Different models of interaction between transmission and distribution 
x Key questions to inform future arrangements 
Some initial comments on chapter 5 of the Call for Evidence 
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The Call for Evidence VD\V´'12VPXVWHQJDJHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHLU
stakeholders, including traditional generators and demand customers, as well as local 
DXWKRULWLHVFRPPXQLW\JURXSVDQGRWKHULQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVµ,QRXUYLHZWKDWLVWUXHEXWLW
is not quite HQRXJKMXVWWRVD\´PXVWHQJDJHµ0DQ\'12VFODLPWKDWWKH\DOUHDG\GR
engage. What, precisely, should they be seeking to learn or to help stakeholders to learn? 
2IJHP%(,6´VHHYDOXHLQWUDQVSDUHQWDQGLQWHJUDWHGPDUNHWV:HH[SHFWWRVHHVXFK
approaches XVHGZKHUHYHULWLVPRVWHIILFLHQWWRGRVRµ7KLVVHHPVUHDVRQDEOHWRXVEXW
one key point of argument is who buys services, in particular: the NETSO, or DSOs? 
The Call for Evidence SRLQWVWRZDUGVSRVVLEOHPRGHOVIRUDFWLYLWLHVLQUHODWLRQWR¶1HWZRUN
PODQQLQJ·DQG¶efficient local/system-ZLGHXVHRIUHVRXUFHV·:HEHOLHYHWKDWFDUHVKRXOGEH
taken that "network planning" and system operation/utilisation of resources are not seen as 
two, entirely separate things. The purpose of network planning is to enable system 
operation such that the long-term total cost of assets and operational measures is 
minimised (subject to a reliability constraint if that is not somehow costed in the operational 
measures). 
The Call for Evidence PHQWLRQV´FUHDWLQJDVLJQDOIRUIlexible resource that could turn up 
demand to help match generation in that local area. Alternatively, changes could be made to 
system access arrangements, such that pricing for a given level of access more dynamically 
reflects system constraints, and to give consumers greater choice over their preferred level 
RIDFFHVVµ7KLVLVDOOJRRGLQWKHRU\EXWLWRQO\ZRUNVLQSUDFWLFHLISDUWLHVDIIHFWHGE\
VLJQDOVKDYHWKHDELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRWKHP$OVR´PDUNHWSDUWLFLSDQWVZRXOGUHDFWLQ
response to the pricHVLJQDOVµ7KHXVHIXOQHVVRIWKLVGHSHQGVRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKSULFHV
reflect problems that are coming rather than those that have already arisen, and if they do 
only the latter, whether the time lag in responding to the signals puts reliability of supply at 
risk. 
One thing the Call for Evidence highlights is the possibility of DSOs contributing to the 
management of system frequency. One way in which this could be done would be by 
procurement within their areas of certain proportions of the total response (and reserve) 
requirements. That would be analogous to how it is done in the European synchronous area 
and was done in GB prior to the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
(BETTA). However, the European arrangement is being increasingly criticised on the grounds 
of (a) failing to take account of 'imbalance netting' between different areas and (b) failing to 
procure the most cost-effective resources for response and reserve. 
Actions on distribution networks: asset-based interventions versus operational measures 
Through price signals or liabilities for network reinforcement costs, DER can be strongly 
disincentivised either from seeking a connection in a particular place or from connecting at 
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all. If there are other, more suitable locations with available network capacity that the 
connectee can use, the connection can be made without a need for deeper reinforcement; 
provided the cost of re-orienting the DER for a different location is not excessive, from the 
perspective of total system cosWRUWRWDOVRFLDOZHOIDUHWKLVJLYHVWKH¶ULJKW·RXWFRPH
However, as the volume of connected DER increases, the amount of available network 
capacity is likely to become exhausted and some reinforcement would appear to become 
necessary. In this case, thougKD¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·DSSURDFKLVXQOLNHO\WRPD[LPLVHVRFLDO
welfare. Both demand and the power available from generation vary in time and some 
temporary restriction of utilisation of the available DER is very likely to reduce the necessary 
enhancement of network capacity. As illustrated in Figure 3, the optimal level of network 





operation of a distribution network than has usually been the case in the past, and a need 
IRUWKHQHWZRUNRSHUDWRUWREHFRQWLQXDOO\DZDUHRIWKHQHWZRUN·VVWDWHDQGto be able to 
send a signal to the DG to change its operating point. Rather than increase staffing levels in 
the control room, many DNOs have sought to achieve this viDDXWRPDWHG¶DFWLYHQHWZRUN
PDQDJHPHQW·$10:KHUHERWKWKHQHWZRUNFRQVWUDLQWDQGWKH'*DFWLRQWRUHOLHYHLWDUH
very clear, this can be straightforwardly implemented via measurement of the relevant 
network state and a signal sent directly to the DG control system, analogous to automatic 
generation control (AGC) used on some transmission systems for decades. More robust 
IRUPVRI$10ZLOOLQFOXGHVRPH¶IDLOVDIH·UXOHVIRUPRGLILFDWLRQRIWKH'*VHW-point in the 
event of, for example, failure of communication of the network measurement. Furthermore, 
some are now being designed to include the measurement or estimation of real-time 
thermal ratings. However, because it is ² for them ² a new approach, DNOs have tended to 
make use of innovation funding to help pay for ANM. According to UKERC and +XE1HW·V
review of LCNF projects72$10LVQRZUHJDUGHGDVDFUHGLEOH¶EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO·RSWLRQWR
offer to DG connection applicants.  
                                           





Figure 3 - the economic level of network capacity 
The benefits of ANM to connection applicants are (i) the reduction of the cost of the 
connection and (ii) reduction of delays to connection that may arise due to the need for 
planning approval for a conventional network reinforcement and its construction. However, 
experiences of some DG operators suggest some problems: (i) levels of curtailment are 
greater than they were led to expect by the DNO when they accepted the ANM-based 
connection offer; and, if they apply to connect in to a part of the network already subject to 
an ANM scheme, they are curtailed more than the party that connected first. 
Other potential interventions by DNOs designed to maximise the utilisation of existing 
infrastructure, facilitate access and reduce or defer the need for network reinforcement 
include the more general use of real-time ratings (and the associated necessary monitoring) 
of overhead lines, transformers or underground cables, network reconfiguration, i.e. 
movement of normally open points, and use of energy storage or flexible demand. However, 
according to the UKERC and HubNet LCNF review, few of these are currently regarded by all 
'12VLQ%ULWDLQDVHVWDEOLVKHG¶EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO·RSWLRQV While solutions like ANM provide 
a deferral to network upgrades in the near-term, the long-term optimum trajectory may 
involve more network investment than is immediately apparent. In order to determine 
whether future bottlenecks in implementation73 might impede achievement of emissions 
targets, any major decarbonisation trajectory requires assessment of the rate at which 
infrastructure changes should be enacted74. For this reason, the RIIO process should take 
into account the longer-term energy transition rather than purely the goals of the 
immediate submission period. 
                                           
73 This includes the equipment supply chain, construction and commissioning resources 
and network access. 
74 One example relates to heat decarbonisation. One option for that would be extensive 
roll-out of heat pumps the delivery of which and any consequential upgrades to distribution 
networks would place great pressures on supply chains. Another long-term option would 
involve use of hydrogen which, in turn, would also require extensive changes to equipment. 
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In seeking to achieve market-led and competitive measures, it should also be borne in mind 
that in certain (remote or highly urbanised) parts of the network, the number of local market 
participants may be highly constrained and limited to a small set of commercial operators. 
This creates potential for market power.  However, potential for market power in respect of 
flexible resources also exists in cases where particular generators, aggregators or suppliers 
gain dominance in any particular location. 
Additionally, network planning needs to consider all vectors (electricity, gas, heat) as 
decarbonisation trajectories imply a greater interaction between systems. The costs and 
benefits of changes to energy services across all vectors may not be balanced. There is no 
specific mention in the Call for Evidence of heat strategies, which may be a key driver of 
DNO planning and operational scenarios. 
Incentives and access to information 
ANM-UHODWHGFRQQHFWLRQRIIHUVDUHW\SLFDOO\¶QRQ-ILUP·LQWhat the connectee receives no 
compensation for curtailment. The business case for a generation development, for 
example, then depends entirely on how much energy can be physically exported and sold 
compared to the costs of the development, not how much energy was available.  Greater 
than expected curtailment may mean that the costs cannot be recovered. Under such 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHFRQQHFWHHPD\EHZHOODGYLVHGQRWWRGHSHQGRQWKH'12·VIRUHFDVWVRI
curtailment. However, few connectees have access to inforPDWLRQRQWKHQHWZRUN·V
configuration and limits. In addition, many developments are within groups that include at 
least some demand where the network constraint concerns the net export, and the 
connectee again lacks time series of demand to compare with available generation output. 
Furthermore, both generation and demand can be quite different from one year to the next, 
e.g. due to variations in weather. In other words, under typical arrangements in GB, the DG 
developer carries all the risk and the DNO carries none. Although it might be argued that 
WKH'12·VUHJXODWRU\VHWWOHPHQWDQGFRVWRIFDSLWDODUHSUHGLFDWHGRQORZRUQRULVNWKHUH
would also appear to beDVLGHIURPZKDWHYHUEHKDYLRXULVGULYHQE\WKH¶WRWH[·HOHPHQWRI
RIIO (see the discussion below), no strong incentive to innovate to find cost-effective 
solutions to problems in the overall best interests of energy users. On the other hand, one 
general economic principle is that risk should be borne by those parties best placed to 
manage it. In the case of risk associated with operation of the network, it should be self-
evident that the DNO has better access to information to enable its management than the 
operator of a connected DG. 
One key to the success of any future arrangement is whether it enables ² or encourages ² 
WKHFRUUHFWEDODQFHWREHVWUXFNEHWZHHQ¶DVVHW-EDVHG·VROXWLRQVWKDWUHTXLUHFDSLWDO
expenditure, and operational measures. Usually, a correct decision depends on having 
access to all relevant information as well as incentives that drive towards lowest whole 
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system cost (including both investment and operational costs over the medium to long term) 
or maximum social welfare. In that context, the following questions might be asked in 
respect of decisions affecting distribution and who takes them: 
x Does the NETSO have enough knowledge of actual conditions on the ground within 
distribution networks, which options are feasible, and what they are likely to cost?  
x What scope is there for changing an option in light of better information, e.g. 
regarding the actual cost (that becomes apparent in light of detailed design work or 
a procurement process) of the option that was initially chosen?  
x If the DSO/DNO is still making a decision and only needs to 'consider' the NETSO's 
assessment, why does the NETSO need to be involved? 
The present regulatory environment would seem to be relevant. One of the features of RIIO 
regulation75 IRUWKHGLVWULEXWLRQOLFHQFHHVLVWKDWWKHUHLVD¶WRWH[·DOORZDQFHUDWKHUWKDQ
separate capex and opex allowances76) which, in principle, allows a DNO to compare asset-
based interventions with operational measures and to adopt the cheapest means of 
complying with basic licence requirements. However, this is different from the apparent 
direction of decision making and responsibility at a transmission level where the trend is 
towards a cost-benefit analysis comparing possible asset-based interventions with 
operational measures being carried out by one party (the NETSO) but final decisions on 
capital expenditure and the detailed design of new network facilities being left to a different 
party, either one of the three incumbent transmission owners or, as introduced under the 
¶,QWHJUDWHG7UDQVPLVVLRQ3ODQQLQJDQG5HJXODWLRQ·,735LQLWLDWLYHD¶&RPSHWLWLYHO\$ZDUGHG
TransmissioQ2ZQHU·&$72,WLVRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWRQHRIWKHVWDUWLQJDVVXPSWLRQV
for ITPR is that, as a consequence of a large part of their income being determined by the 
size of the asset base, network licensees are always incentivised to over-invest in assets77.  
As well as the assumption that network owners have perverse incentives there is an implicit 
assumption in ITPR that the NETSO is, and always will be, competent to carry out its duties 
in the best possible way. An enhanced role for the NETSO ² whether as an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) or not, whether for-profit or not ² increases reliance on a single 
monolithic service provider. How can it be encouraged to innovate and improve? What 
benefits might come from having a range of parties all fulfilling similar functions (albeit 
                                           
75 RIIO stands for Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs 
76 ¶&DSH[·LVFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUH¶RSH[·LVRSHUDWLQJH[SHQGLWXUHDQG¶WRWH[·LVWRWDO
expenditure. 
77 Our opinion is that this incentive, while a relevant consideration, has been over-stated. 
For some discussion, see Transmission-distribution coordination and transition to more 




perhaps with spatially delineated scope) whose performance can be compared one with 
another? 
The NETSO or an ISO with an enhanced role in respect of operation of distribution networks 
will, in the short-term at least, be dependent on the DNOs for provision of information. 
DNOs are supposed to provide a certain amount of data now but, as far as we are aware, it 
is not done well. (See our answer to Q44). Why is this? Is it because there is no incentive to 
do it well or no penalty for doing it badly? 
Different models of interaction between transmission and distribution 
Some authors, e.g. Bell in a paper on future distribution system operation78, have proposed 
that management of large numbers of actors and system states might be effectively 
managed through the delegation of the management of sub-systems to different parties. 
The key to such a hierarchical approach is the definition of where the interfaces between 
layers of the hierarchy lie and how the relationships between different parties interacting at 
that interface are managed. The key to the latter is exactly what information is exchanged 
and how often. Perhaps the most obvious locations for interfaces are (a) across different 
voltage levels and (b) across minimal cutsets79. The information passing should be as 
infrequent as possible and involve as little data as possible but not so infrequent or minimal 
as to be useless. 
DeMartini and Kristov in California have outlined some models for future distribution 
operation, real-time facilitation of DG and interaction with the wider electricity system80. 
These are: 
x Model A ² ´7RWDO,62µLQZKLFKDQLQGHSHQGHQWV\VWHPRSHUDWRU,62PRGHOVDQG
optimizes the whole system, with visibility of distribution grid conditions and all DER 
above a low size threshold, e.g. 0.5 MW modelled at actual locations. In this model, a 
DNO has minimal new functions, its operational role being limited primarily to 
ensuring safety and the reliability of assets.  
                                           
78 .HLWK%HOODQG6LPRQ*LOO´(QDEOLQJGLVWULEXWHGHQHUJ\UHVRXUFHV3ULRULWLHVIRUIXWXUH
DFWLYHRSHUDWLRQRIGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQVZLWKWUDQVPLVVLRQµDFFHSWHGIRU
CIRED 2017, 24th International Conference on Electricity Distribution, Glasgow, 12-15 June 
2017. 
79 A 'cutset' is a set of branches of a network that, if removed from the network, would 
completely disconnect a source of power from a sink. A 'minimal cutset' is a cutset in which 
all the branches in the cutset must be removed from the network in order to carry the 
disconnection of source and sink. 
80 Paul De Martini and Lorenzo Kristov, Distribution Systems In A High Distributed Energy 




x Model B ² ´0LQLPDO'62µLQZKLFKDQ,62RSWLPL]HVWKHZKROHV\VWHPLQFOXGLQJODUJH
numbers of small DERs, but models DERs only at the transmission-distribution (T-D) 
interface with little or no visibility into the distribution system. In this model a DNO 
has a significant coordination role, managing DER responses to ISO dispatches as 
well as DER services provided to the distribution network.  
x Model C ² ´0DUNHW'62µZKLFKPD[LPL]HVWKH'12UROHLQRSHUDWLRQDOFRRUGLQDWLRQ
i.e. in the terms used in GB, it becomes a DSO, and minimizes the complexity for an 
,62·VRSWLPL]DWLRQRIWKHV\VWHP7KLVPRGHOKDVWZRYDULDQWV² C1 and C2. In Model 
C1, the ISO sees only a small number of aggregate DERs at each T-D interface; a DSO 
is the coordinator of various aggregators. In Model C2, the ISO sees only one 
resource at each T-D interface; a DSO is the aggregator for all DERs below that 
interface.  
The electricity regulator in the state of New York in the US is encouraging potentially radical 
UHIRUPRIWKHHOHFWULFLW\PDUNHWLQLWV¶5HIRUPLQJ(QHUJ\9LVLRQ·5(981. Its primary feature 
is an extension of centralised wholesale electricity trading based on locational marginal 
pricing down to low voltage nodes within distribution networks for which the main challenge 
is seen as the development of a suitably large and powerful software platform capable of 
managing hundreds of thousands of data points and computing and communicating 
locational marginal prices (LMPs) at regular intervals. 
,Q%ULWDLQ63(QHUJ\1HWZRUNVKDVSXEOLVKHGD´'629LVLRQµLQZKLFKIRXUSRVVLEOH
operational models are outlined, shown in Figure 4 in respect of their relative positions vis à 





                                           




Figure 4- V\VWHPRSHUDWLRQPRGHOVIURP63(QHUJ\1HWZRUNV·´'629LVLRQµ 
Key questions to inform future arrangements 
Future arrangements for energy trading and system operation should be structured such 
that: 
x there is competition and choice for consumers; 
x the system can be safely operated in accordance with relevant physical limits; 
x consumer access to the system is enabled; 
x the overall cost of the system is minimised with use made of suitable signals, such 
as locational prices or tariffs, aimed at parties able respond to them; 
x there is scope for innovation. 
Some corollary questions arise from these objectives: 
x What contributions can DER make to ancillary services and which party or parties are 
best placed to procure them, e.g. a transmission system operator or a DSO? 
x Is the facilitation of peer-to-peer trading in real-time or near real-time a worthwhile 
and realisable goal, or does forward trading suffice to give the main useful signals? 
x Can owners/operators of DER interact with and respond in a rational way to signals 
such as half-hourly locational pricing, or do the smallest parties require specialist 
agents, e.g. aggregators, to act on their behalf or order that risks can be managed? 
x Which arrangements provide adequate signals to investment in additional network 
facilities and which parties, e.g. regulated network owners, should respond to such 
signals? 
The models set out by DeMartini and Kristov acknowledge the scale of the data management 
FKDOOHQJH,QSULQFLSOHD´7RWDO,62µ0RGHO$PLJKWPRGHODQGFRQWUROWKHZKROHV\VWHP




MXULVGLFWLRQLVVXHVµ0RGHO%² ´0LQLPDO'62µ² addresses some of those problems through 
an ISO modelling only the effect of each DER at the transmission-distribution (T-D) interface 
with the DSO responsible for articulating those effects and implementing any DER actions 
called upon by the ISO. In our opinion (which should be tested by relevant modelling), one 
problem is that, by virtue of the nesting of different network limits and the non-linearity of 
voltage/reactive power limits, the effect of each DER at the T-D interface and the margin for 
variation is not the same for each one and actions taken with respect to one DER change the 
margin for available in respect of another, i.e. the headroom for increases and footroom for 
decreases,. While approximations are possible, the lack of accuracy in the model is likely to 
HQWDLORWKHU¶RXWVLGHWKHPDUNHW·UH-dispatches or a very conservative setting of limits 
meaning that the cheapest resources will be under-utilised. 
Model C ² ´0DUNHW'62µ² further reduces the number of variables seen by the ISO by 
articulating only the aggregate effect of all DER at each T-D interface (in GB terms, each grid 
supply point) such that, in variant C1, there are very few and, in C2, only one virtual DER at 
each location. Unlike the earliest ideas of virtual power plants (VPPs), this virtual unit has a 
physical meaning with location as well resource specific active and reactive power limits. In 
this model, the ISO (or, in GB, the NETSO) optimises its system up to T-D interface. As well 
as quantifying the planned, scheduled or forecast physical position of the virtual DERs, the 
DSO quotes an envelope of allowable changes and associated costs. Unlike in Model B, it is 
responsible for buying actions from individual DERs in response to changes bought by the 
ISO and makes use of a more detailed model of the distribution network than would be used 
in Model B. That is, in essence, it optimises the local system to satisfy a given interchange at 
the substation. This is similar to the hierarchical model outlined above which goes a step 
further in recognising that there can be nested groups within each group of aggregated 
DERs with different progressively more local DSOs managing details behind each interface. 
7KH1HZ<RUN5(9SODWIRUPPRGHOLVLQHIIHFWDYHUVLRQRIWKH´7RWDO,62µZLWKDVLQJOHDOO-
encompassing, market arrangement cleared by a central algorithm. However, there remains 
the challenge of deciding how finely grained this should be: should it include, in the 
extreme case, every toaster when there is the possibility, as DeMartini and Kostov put it, of 
´GLPLQLVKLQJUHWXUQVWRFRPSOH[LW\µ",WVKRXOGDOVREHQRWHG that a centralised market 
clearance in a physical constrained system is only as good as its model of the system. Just 
as with zonal pricing, to neglect some details of the system means losing the price signals 
arising from the limits that are not modelled resulting in a need for a system operator to 
WDNHDFWLRQ¶RXWVLGHPDUNHW·WRUHVSHFWWKRVHOLPLWV'LVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNVLQPRVWFRXQWULHV
at present are not modelled at all at lower voltages; to extract and reconcile data from often 
very old and sometimes incomplete paper records is a major challenge. Then, there is the 
possibility of congestion being relieved by network reconfiguration, i.e. opening and closing 
of open points, actions that introduce integer variables into an optimisation used to 
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compute locational marginal prices. Finally, there is the ever-present exposure to the 
exercise of locational market power. 
$QRWLQFRQVLGHUDEOHDPRXQWRIFRQVXPHUV·PRQH\WKURXJKYDULRXVLQQRYDWLRQIXQGVKDV
already been spent by DNOs in Britain on building up network models, with more funding 
still sought. But, as far as we are aware, there has been little evident sharing of the methods 
EHWZHHQ'12V0RUHRYHUDVIDUDVZHDUHDZDUHWKHVHPRGHOVDUH¶VWDWLF·LQWKDWDWKH\
are not updated in real-time as operational conditions change and (b) they do not include 
¶DFWLYHRSHUDWLRQ·DFWLRQVWKDWD'62PLJKWWDNH,QDGGLWLRQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJLVWKDWWKH
NETSO has been investing in a new energy management system that is intended to include 
new system optimisation features but is yet to be delivered and does not include any 
DGGLWLRQDO¶UHDFK·LQWRWKHGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNV,QRWKHUZRUGVLQVSLWHRIWKHVXPVDOUHDG\
spent on system modelling, considerably more would need to spent regardless of which 
future system operation model is adopted. In our view, the deliverability and maintainability 
of the associated ICT systems should be part of the evaluation of models of future system 
operation and how the transition from current practice can be achieved. One aspect that 
should be considered is whether the risks associated with one large, all-encompassing ICT 
system would be bigger or smaller than those associated with a number of smaller systems 
that have defined interfaces allowing interactions between different network utilities to be 
managed and whether the latter approach would allow concepts, data exchanges and 






 Can you give specific examples of types of support that would be most effective in 
bringing forward innovation in these areas?  
Further innovation will be essential if the potential of system flexibility is to be 
realised, and broader energy policy goals are to be met. Against this background, we 
welcome the increasing role that Ofgem has played in providing incentives for 
innovation over the past few years. The Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCNF) is a 
notable example, and has been cited in the Call for Evidence as the source of much 
of the evidence that underpins BEIS and Ofgem work on smart, flexible systems.  
47) Can you give specific examples of types of support that would be most effective 
in bringing forward innovation in these areas?  
UKERC and HubNet commissioned and recently published a systematic review and synthesis 
of LCNF projects82.  Therefore, we have based our answer to this question on some of the 
main findings from this review. Its main findings can be summarised as follows: 
x ¶$FWLYH·PDQDJHPHQt of generation connected to the distribution network and 
IOH[LEOHLQGXVWULDODQGFRPPHUFLDOGHPDQGVKRXOGERWKEHYLDEOH¶EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO·
options.  
x Voltage control equipment, which has performed well in trials, could be used more 
often and can release QHWZRUNFDSDFLW\PRUHFKHDSO\WKDQKLVWRULFDO¶ILWDQGIRUJHW·
solutions.  
x Battery storage is not yet cost-effective, and flexible domestic demand not yet 
effective in avoiding the need for network reinforcement. Both innovations require 
further development both in terms of implementation and the commercial 
frameworks within which they might be used.  
x The DNOs reach mixed and sometimes contradictory conclusions on other 
innovations such as real-time thermal ratings of network branches and network 
reconfiguration for power flow management. 
x Many LCNF projects focussed on equipment that was, to date, unfamiliar to DNOs in 
Britain. Knowledge has been gained on commissioning and operational performance, 
but more now needs to be done on system level methodologies and business 
processes such as optimal operation, support for investment decision making, and 
commercial and regulatory frameworks. 
The UKERC/HubNet review recommended that support for network innovation is continued 
in order that learning can be built upoQDQGWKHUHYLYDOLQ'12V·DELOLW\WROHDGUHVHDUFK
                                           




development and demonstration is consolidated. Furthermore, it recommended that work in 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJSRWHQWLDOLQQRYDWLRQVDWPHGLXP¶WHFKQRORJ\UHDGLQHVVOHYHOV·75/VVKRXOG
be recognised and rewarded even if the TRL advancement does not immediately lead to full 
commercial deployment of the technology. It also urged a deeper appreciation by both 
network licensees and Ofgem of the scientific process in particular in respect of (a) the 
design of trials/experiments in order that robust evidence can be gained and (b) the clear 
reporting of results, including of those innovations for which were results were not what was 
expected.  
The main original definitions of TRLs have come from aeronautics sector in which safe, 
UHOLDEOHRSHUDWLRQLQD¶UHDOZRUOG·FRQWH[WLVSDUDPRXQW2WKHUGHILQLWLRQVDJUHHZLWKWKLV
EXWDGGLQDIXUWKHUGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQD75/RIDQGRQHRI¶FRPPHUFLDOYLDELOLW\·RI
which one main test is whether investors have confidence in it and the ability to make a 
return on an investment.  In other words, in some cases all that might be required to move 
from TRL 8 to 9 is that investors are given access to some evidence that changes their 
perception of a technology or business process. 
We believe that rewards for success should recognise the relative risk and uncertainty 
involved in developing ideas and trialling innovations at different TRLs and should place an 
appropriate balance of emphasis between: good project management; the quality of 
evidence produced and conclusions on how a TRL has been progressed; what TRL an 
innovation has reached; and whether investment is justified in seeking further TRL progress. 
However, we would also urge caution when Government or Ofgem are asked to fund 
¶GHPRQVWUDWLRQV·RIH[SHQVLYHWHFKQRORJLHVRUSURFHVVHVWKDWKDYHQRW\HWUHDFKHGD75/RI
7 or 8 or for which the following are not defined: (a) the learning outcomes expected from 
WKHGHPRQVWUDWLRQDQGEWKHSDWKWRFRPPHUFLDOYLDELOLW\RU¶EXVLQHVVDV XVXDO·WKDWLV
anticipated given a positive outcome from the demonstration.  Such innovations are likely to 
benefit from smaller scale testing or desktop analysis that can inform subsequent 
demonstration work; provided such testing and analysis are specified and conducted well 
and the results are properly disseminated, we no reason why testing or analysis of 
promising innovations at TRLs of lower than 8 should not be funded through Ofgem-led 
funding schemes. 
However, the transition to a low carbon electricity system could be achieved with lower costs 
if some technology or process risks are taken in the short to medium term. An important 
lesson from LCNF is that such risks should be built in to innovation programmes. The 
government and regulator therefore need to accept that there will be some innovations that, 
while initially appearing to be positive, turn out to be more expensive or problematic to 
commercialise. Therefore, in encouraging DNOs to be innovative, publicly funded innovation 
programmes should noWSHQDOLVHWKHPIRULQGLYLGXDOLQQRYDWLRQ¶IDLOXUHV·² and should be 
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concerned with ensuring that a portfolio of projects are funded that, taken together, meet 
the overall programme objectives. 
48) Do you think these are the right areas for innovation funding support? Please 
state reasons or, if possible, provide evidence to support your answer. 
The four areas outlined in the Call for Evidence are good priorities for future support. Our 
review of LCNF highlights some others in addition to these (see summary above, for 
example). An advantage of these priorities is that they are not wholly concerned with 
technological innovation. As the Call for Evidence illustrates, realising the potential of smart, 
flexible electricity systems is partly about the development and deployment of new 
technologies, and partly about the new market arrangements, business models and social 
relationships that are likely to accompany those technologies. This is particularly relevant to 
the automated DSR and flexibility trading themes.   
If future funding focuses on these areas, a number of considerations should be taken into 
account: 
x The desirability of a balanced portfolio of individual projects across these themes; 
x The need to ensure that individual innovation projects take proper account of their 
relationship to the system as a whole; and 
x The importance of supporting projects led by a range of different firms and other 
actors 
The third of these considerations is a response to one of the potential downsides of 
2IJHP·VLQQRYDWLRQSURJUDmmes. For good reasons, they have focused on encouraging 
innovation in regulated network companies. Whilst this has strengthened the capacity of 
these companies (particularly DNOs) to innovate, it has also tended to lead to rather 
incremental innovations. Having complementary funding available (e.g. the £50m available 
directly from BEIS) will enable this innovation programme to support projects that are not 
led by DNOs ² and provide much needed support to new entrant firms, for example.  
7 Appendix: access to data 
Much of the Call for Evidence asks for evidence to support assertions. This is, in our view an 
entirely reasonable request and is made more explicit in question 44 which asks the 
following. 
Do you have any data which illustrates:  
a) the current scale and cost of the system impacts described in table 7, and how 
these might change in the future?  
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b) the potential efficiency savings which could be achieved, now and in the future, 
through a more co-ordinated approach to managing these impacts? 
Table 7 of the Call for Evidence lists and gives examples of various system impacts arising 
from changing use of the distribution network by connectees, use of distributed energy 
resources (DER) and increasing need for distribution connected resources to support system 
operation. Although some physical network demonstration  projects, e.g. those supported 
by the Low Carbon Networks Fund, have observed some impacts of distribution connected 
resources, the scale of what can be observed on the actual network to date is limited, both 
because the number of DER installations is very far from having reached the level that can 
be expected in the coming years, and the range of different conditions in which they have 
operated (e.g. different times of year and different weather conditions) has been too limited 
to have statistical significance. A significant degree of modelling is therefore required (as it 
would be, in any case, if key relationships between observed DER behaviour and system 
impacts are to be inferred). 
As we note in our answer to Q44, one particular challenge faced by anyone attempting to 
develop evidence highlighting the extent of the challenges the power system faces or in 
support of particular interventions is access to relevant data describing the GB power system 
now from which possible future scenarios can be developed. This is hindered by much of 
ZKDWLVUHTXLUHGWRPRGHOWKH*%V\VWHPEHLQJUHJDUGHGDV´FRPPHUFLDOO\FRQILGHQWLDOµHYHQ
though, in our opinion, it is hard to envisage in respect of much of it quite what commercial 
advantage might come from having it or commercial disadvantage from come from 
disclosing it. Lack of access to relevant data by parties other than the network licensees 
places a high dependency on studies conducted by the licensees, requires other parties such 
as academics to make assumptions that might not be robust, thus invalidating their 
ILQGLQJVSUHYHQWVOLFHQVHHV·ILQGLQJVIURPEHLQJFKDOOHQJHGDQGKLQGHUVLQQRYDWLRQ 
In this Appendix, we give some examples of what we see as good and practice in respect of 
making data available to independent analysts. 
Good practice 
63(QHUJ\1HWZRUNV·´)OH[LEOH1HWZRUNVµ/&1)SURMHFW 
Flexible Networks for a Low Carbon Future was a Low Carbon Networks Fund innovation 
project, led by SP Energy Networks. As part of the project, network monitoring equipment 
was installed in eight primary (33/11kV) and over 150 secondary (11kV/415V) substations 
in three test areas. Monitored quantities included voltage and current and derived quantities 
included real and reactive power and power quality. Measurements were generally taken at 
outgoing circuits, although in some cases transformers were also monitored. 
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For the purpose of evaluating real-time ratings of transformers, for certain primary 
substations, transformer temperature measurements were collected for part of the study 
period, as were weather measurements. 
SP Energy Networks and the University of Strathclyde have been working towards providing 
access to the complete data set (which is hosted by the University of Strathclyde) in 
response to requests. 
Data is generally tabulated at 10-minute intervals, although some substations and 
quantities are tabulated at 1-minute intervals. Not all substations were monitored for the 
complete study period, and there are known to be significant gaps in some data series. 
Supporting information is also being made available as part of the data set, including more 
detailed descriptions of the monitoring approach; charts showing daily availability of data by 
substation; and distribution network diagrams and models. 
DS2030 project managed through the ENA 
As part of the RIIO-ED1 price control process83, a software product developed and marketed 
E\($7HFKQRORJ\´7UDQVIRUPµZDVXVHGWRJLYHHVWLPDWHVRQWKHFRVWVVDvings that might 
DULVHIURPXVHRI¶VPDUW·GLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNLQWHUYHQWLRQV$FFRUGLQJWR($7HFKQRORJ\
7UDQVIRUPHQDEOHV'12V´WRRSWLPLVHWKHLQYHVWPHQWVWKH\QHHGWRLQWHJUDWHVPDUWJULG
technologies into existing networks, with the lowest possible amount of new engineering 
work and maximum cost-HIILFLHQF\µDQG´GUDZVRQDQXPEHURIIDFWRUVLQFOXGLQJWKH
operating characteristics of devices and their relationships to other technologies within a 
V\VWHPµ84. However, it is our understanding that significant doubts have been expressed by 
DNO engineers regarding the simplifications used in Transform. 
In 2014, Workstream 7 of the Smart Grid Forum launched a project ² ´'6µIXQGHG
through the Network Innovation Allowance ² DLPHGDW´DGGUHVVLQJWKHPRGHOOLQg 
FRPSURPLVHVWKDWDUHLQKHUHQWLQ7UDQVIRUP·VSDUDPHWULFQHWZRUNPRGHOOLQJDSSURDFK
7UDQVIRUP·VSDUDPHWULFUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIW\SLFDOGLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNVDUHWREHFRQYHUWHG
into nodal models in order to explore, through appropriate network studies, how the 
7UDQVIRUPVROXWLRQV¶ZRUN·DQGZKDWFXUUHQWO\XQIRUHVHHQFKDOOHQJHVPLJKWHPHUJHµ85. More 
explicitly, the work aimed at a more rigorous assessment of the technical viability of 
GLIIHUHQW¶VPDUW·LQWHUYHQWLRQVDQGWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVWKDn is possible using 
Transform. 
                                           
83 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/network-regulation-riio-model/riio-ed1-price-control  
84 See https://www.eatechnology.com/products-and-services/create-smarter-
grids/transform-model%C2%AE  
85 See http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=1623  
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In September 2016, 4 network models (notably based closely on real-world networks) 
representing a spectrum of distribution networks from 132kV down to 11kV (but also 
including some domestic LV modelling) were made available vLDWKH´6PDUWHU1HWZRUNV
3RUWDOµLQIRUPWKDWFDQEHUHDGLO\LPSRUWHGLQWRDVWDQGDUGFRPPHUFLDOSRZHUV\VWHP
analysis software package. The accompanying project reports are sufficient for external 
users to be able to work with and extend the modelling used in DS2030, and have already 
attracted substantial interest, permitting useful research to be undertaken on applying 
UHVHDUFKWR¶UHDO-ZRUOG·QHWZRUNV,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHUHOHDVHGPRGHOVDUHQRW
absolutely identical to the actual ones used in the DS2030 project, but that rather than 
block access altogether some minor amendments have been made to ameliorate commercial 
issues, and this is a desirable resolution to such concerns. 
A mix of good and less good practice: a reduced GB system dynamic model 
Most issues around stability of the electricity system and its ability to successful transition 
IURPRQHEDODQFHGVWDWHWRDQRWKHUFDQQRWEHDGGUHVVHGZLWK¶VWHDG\VWDWH·PRGHOVWKDW
neglect the dynamics of the system and which determine, among other things, the volume 
RIQHHGIRUDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWDQFLOODU\VHUYLFHV$OWKRXJKVRPHVWHDG\VWDWHRU¶TXDVL
VWHDG\VWDWH·PRGHOVPLJKWWU\WRUHSUHVHQWWKHHIIHFWVRIG\QDPLFLVVXHVWKURXJKWKH
quantification of some additional constraints86, quite what value to use for these constraints 
depends on more detailed dynamic modelling. However, while independent researchers can 
try to make use of generic dynamic models, they lack access to the details of control system 
configurations and plant parameters that would allow them to quote results for the GB 
system with any confidence87. 
Two of the main stumbling blocks are perceptions of commercial confidentiality and 
interpretations of certain clauses of the 1989 Electricity Act. In response to this, National 
Grid has developed a reduced model of the GB transmission network augmented with a 
number of dynamic generator and controller models, and made this available to academics 
to work with. We are aware of the model being published as early as in 2013. The latest 
version is a 36 zone representation of GB with generation, differentiated by type, and real 
and reactive demand evaluated for each zone. The model also includes equivalent branch 
impedances calculated via a reduction of the high voltage lines on the actual system as well 
as generic models of generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR_ and governor controllers 
for dynamic studies although there is no consideration of the dynamic performance of 
demand.   
                                           
86 Recent analysis undertaken by Imperial College for the UK Government and the 
Committee on Climate Change uses such an approach. 






there seem to remain limitations to the model which in turn limit the confidence with which 
results can be interpreted. Earlier versions came with a limited set of documentation which 
detailed some of the underlying assumptions and showed a degree of validation in terms of 
generic AVR and governor models plus evaluation of system losses and fault level 
SHUIRUPDQFHFRPSDUHGZLWK1DWLRQDO*ULG·VIXOO*%PRGHOZKLFKZHUH said to show an 
´DFFHSWDEOHGHJUHHRIDFFXUDF\µ+RZHYHUZHDUHQRWDZDUHRIDQ\SXEOLVKHGYDOLGDWLRQRI
whole system response in terms of voltage profile or frequency response to certain fault 
conditions and the latest version comes with little explanatory documentation which again 
raises questions as to the suitability of the model for certain studies and makes 
interpretation of results difficult.    
In a separate initiative, the power systems group at the University of Strathclyde, supported 
by some funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences research Council and UKERC, 
has been working on the development of a different, simplified representation of the GB 
transmission network (intended to give a more realistic picture of network thermal limits 
tKDQZRXOGFRPHIURPDQHWZRUN¶UHGXFWLRQ·DQGXVHGJHQHULFJHQHUDWRUDQGFRQWUROOHU
PRGHOV¶WXQHG·WRDSSUR[LPDWHWKHNLQGVRIUHVSRQVHVWRFHUWDLQFULWLFDOGLVWXUEDQFHVWKDW
would be expected on the actual system. The researchers have received welcome support 
from SP Energy Networks on testing of the model and some advice from National Grid on 
scheduling of frequency response and modelling of loads. They intend to make the finished 
model available to researchers in other institutions. (Draft versions are already available). 
Poor practice: the REACT project 
As part of our response to Question 44 of the Call for Evidence, we described a recent 
Network Innovation Allowance project ² ¶5($&7·² established to address reasons why the 
GSP demands, in particular the reactive power demands, were so low88.  
The budget for the project was around £315k. A research group was engaged at the 
University of Manchester to address the main questions over a two-year period. We 
understand from them that almost all of their time was taken up in assembling models of a 
limited number of DNO areas and relatively little spent exploring potential solutions to 
problems and their potential costs.  
,WPD\VHHPVXUSULVLQJWKDW'12VGRQRWDOUHDG\KDYHH[WHQVLYH¶ORDGIORZ·PRGHOVRIWKHLU
networks, but historic operational practice has generally not required it for lower than 
132kV or, depending on the location, 33kV. Given the growth of DER and the need for more 
extensive active operation of distribution, the models assembled at Manchester are 
potentially an extremely useful resource for researchers to test different operational 
                                           
88 See http://www.smarternetworks.org/Project.aspx?ProjectID=1861  
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philosophies and the cost-effectiveness of different types of equipment, i.e. exactly the 
things that the DS2030 project commissioned by Workstream 7 of the Smart Grid Forum 
sought to address (and which ended up spending considerable time assembling its own 
models89). Furthermore, it is our understanding that one of the conditions of NIA funding is 
that results and data should be disseminated. However, our request for access to the 
models was declined by the project leader on the grounds that confidentiality agreements 
between the various network licensees involved in the project ² National Grid and the 3 
DNOs whose networks were modelled ² did not permit it. To us, this seems perverse given 
that the models extended only down to 11kV at which level few individual network 
customers are connected (and whose data could, in any case, be anonymised) and that, as 
far as we understand, the DNOs should make network models available as part of their 
Long-Term Development Statements (although, in practice, special requests need to be 
submitted). 
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89 It should be acknowledged that the main questions being addressed by the REACT 
project might have led to network areas being modelled that were not the best for the 
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Chapter  a system for the consumer 
 
Before answering these questions, it is worth emphasising the uncertainty attaching 
to (a) definitions of the term ¶VPDUW· in relation to appliances and their control and 
(b) the actual performance of smart/automated products and services, as opposed 
to their estimated potential.   
The consultation document identifies smart appliances as those that can support 
demand-side flexibility because they can be set up to respond to signals such as 
price information, or to direct (remote) control signals. This covers a wide range of 
possibilities, from the freezer enabled for fast frequency response or the smart-
enabled washing machine that can be programmed to switch off at times of high 
demand to the highly-instrumented ¶VPDUW KRPH·  In the latter, potential ¶OLIHVW\OH 
EHQHILWV· are likely to be the main attraction, but network/demand response 
benefits are still uncertain while overall demand reduction will be highly unlikely, 
given the level of additional consumption associated with additional services and 
standby demand from the sensors and control system.  As the consultation 
document acknowledges, consumers will need clear information on smart 
appliances and how to use them; this also applies more widely to the policy and 
research communities. At present, the ¶VPDUW DSSOLDQFH· debate is often muddied by 
associating benefits from particular applications of ICT in energy systems with 
anything that has the term ¶VPDUW· attached. It is important to be specific about just 
what technology configurations, activities, service expectations and (tested) costs 
and benefits are associated with a particular smart appliance or service. 
The second area of uncertainty, relating to performance, comes through clearly in 
the reference cited in the consultation document (the 2015 Frontier Economics 
study for DECC). More generally, there is a striking difference between the 
thousands of research papers that estimate potential benefits from smart 
appliances/systems on the basis of simulations or trials in carefully-controlled lab 
conditions and the handful that report on performance and acceptability in real-life 
conditions.  A default position of skepticism when viewing the claims made for 
  
smart appliances is therefore called for: for each case, questions need to be asked 
such as how they operate in real-life conditions, who is involved in making them 
work reliably and what knowledge and skills are called for, how financial and other 
costs and benefits are distributed, what the range of possible outcomes is and 
whether any are unacceptable, which conditions are most conducive to good 
outcomes and which potential side-effects need monitoring and guarding against.  
  you agree with the 4 principles for smart appliances set out above 
(interoperability, data privacy, grid security, energy consumption)? 
Interoperability 
For products to be truly interoperable, energy management systems require data to 
be shared between different technologies. Yet there is little interoperability as yet 
between smart home devices, with one recent study finding only 12% of smart 
home technologies compatible with other devices1. The smart appliance market is 
changing rapidly with multiple home network protocols (ZigBee, Z-Wave, Wi-Fi) in 
competition. This is confusing to consumers and likely to slow down adoption of 
smart home technology, due to unwillingness to be tied to a single suite or 
products or fear that their hardware may become inoperable if the related software 
is pulled from the market.2 Interoperability may well require regulated open 
standards, although this could reduce incentives to firms to innovate and enter the 
market, particularly if smart appliances are bundled with services. For example, a 
battery sold alongside a service may be sold to a household at a reduced price in 
exchange for a commitment to use that FRPSDQ\·V service.  
It is worth noting here that several ¶VPDUW· applications require very little in the way 
of interoperability and that these may well have the most to offer both networks 
and customers: for example, smart charging of electric vehicles with a combination 
of direct load control and a smart tariff; fast frequency response for electric water 
heaters and for space heating or cooling equipment; localized use of batteries and 
thermal stores to utilize locally-generated electricity. 3  
                                                 
1 Ford, R., Karlin, B., Sanguinetti, A., Nersesyan, A., & Pritoni, M. (2016). Assessing Players, 
Products, and Perceptions of Home Energy Management. San Francisco, CA: Pacific Gas and 
Electric  
2 for example, Google and the Revolv home automation hub, https://arlogilbert.com/the-
time-that-tony-fadell-sold-me-a-container-of-hummus-cb0941c762c1#.l3bzw2l6o  
3 for example, Boait, P.J.,Snape, J.R., Darby, S.J., Hamilton, J. and Morris, R.J.R. (2017) Making 
Legacy Thermal Storage Heating fit for the Smart Grid. Energy and Buildings 138, 630-640   
  
Data privacy 
In an increasingly interconnected world, more and more data is being collected by 
smart appliances and sophisticated energy management systems require data to be 
shared between different technologies. However, companies may not be willing to 
make this available, due to commercial incentives to protect their data assets. It is 
also not clear who owns the data, and whether it belongs to the customer or the 
manufacturer. The evidence also suggests that privacy is one of KRXVHKROGHUV· key 
concerns regarding smart technologies4. Given recent hacking incidents, security is 
likely to become a major source of concern also.  
 
 Regulation and legislation to protect consumers in an increasingly data-driven 
world are lacking, and very few people, consumers or otherwise, have the skills or 
knowledge required to develop robust arrangements for data privacy. There is a 
need to better understand how customers both perceive and engage with smart 
home technology with regard to data privacy issues. In the meantime, a cautious 
approach is called for. For example, the current arrangement by which customers 
have to opt into sharing their smart meter data on a half-hourly basis and can opt 
out of the default sharing on a daily basis is worth maintaining.  We entirely agree 
that ¶FRQVXPHUV must be in control of any data exchanged with third parties arising 
from the appliances with clear consent procedures that will ensure they are able to 
make informed decisions regarding data VKDULQJ·  
Grid security  
Smart appliances may or may not be more energy-efficient than the appliances they 
replace, and they may represent net additions to the stock of appliances. There is 
therefore a risk of increased overall demand on the grid arising both from added 
energy usage of smart technologies themselves as well as increased consumption 
as a result of altering user-technology interactions through smart control. For 
example, many smart appliances enable users to remotely or autonomously control 
their appliances to provide additional comfort or convenience.   
The additional risk of simultaneous remote activation of loads also needs guarding 
against, as stated in the consultation document. Given that smart appliances and 
could represent a risk to security of supply if they add new or undiversified loads to 
the grid, a cautious approach is in order: smart appliances and controls need 
careful assessment to identify how far they contribute to, or detract from, national 
                                                 
4 Wilson, C., Hargreaves, T. and Hauxwell-Baldwin, R., 2015. Smart homes and their users: a 
systematic analysis and key challenges. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 19(2), pp.463-
476. 
  
objectives of energy security and sustainability. These assessments should provide 
evidence to support specification of the criteria for the regulation of smart 
appliances. Where a smart technology or configuration does increase consumption 
(ie, it decreases end-use efficiency), then this negative should be proven to be 
outweighed by benefits elsewhere (most likely to be an increase in system 
efficiency).  
Energy consumption 
This is a major consideration. Smart appliances are typically designed with two main 
aims in mind: load-shifting (with potential benefits for the grid); and an enhanced 
service to the customer (for example, by allowing remote control or being part of a 
system that offers home security services). While smart appliances allow for the 
shifting of demand in time, offering the prospect of network benefits and (in 
conjunction with dynamic tariffs) reduced bills, they do not necessarily lead to 
overall demand reduction: the limited evidence to date suggests that overall 
electricity demand will be more likely to increase than decrease following the 
adoption of smart controls for heating or cooling systems5, while. This point about 
limited evidence is worth emphasizing: there is a startling contrast between the 
number of research papers estimating benefits from smart appliances and systems 
and the number that offer evaluations of their actual performance. Post-occupancy 
evaluation in buildings tells us repeatedly that technologies rarely perform to 
expectations.6  
While the additional energy consumption from individual appliances arising from 
their ability to respond to signals may be very slight, we should not conclude that 
additional consumption from integrated smart homes with many sensors and 
associated hardware will also be negligible. The evidence to date is far from 
reassuring on this point - home automation systems typically involve a range of 
sensors on permanent standby7,8.  Looking at the overall potential for demand 
                                                 
5 for example, Yang and Newman (2013) Learning from a learning thermostat: lessons for 
intelligent systems for the home. Proceedings, UbiComp · pp93-102; Robinson J (2016) 
Impact analysis results for %*(·V wi-fi thermostat pilot (generic version). Report for EPRI. 
6 for a summary of the issues, see Bordass and Leaman (2005) Making feedback and post-
occupancy evaluation routine 1: a portfolio of feedback techniques. Building Research and 
Information 33 (4), 347-352. 
7 see http://edna.iea-4e.org/tasks/task2 for recent IEA report on standby consumption 
implication of the Internet of Things 
  
reduction from smart appliances, even a study estimating the ¶WKHRUHWLFDO savings 
that could be achieved if [connected thermostats, window covering/lighting 
controls, occupancy sensors etc] were adopted by the entire portion of relevant 
KRPHV·  finds no more than 1-5% ¶WHFKQLFDO energy savings and points to the need 
for field studies.9 Furthermore, the energy consumption principle described in the 
call refers only to one factor within a smart DSSOLDQFH·V overall life cycle impact. 
There are other ways in which smart appliances and controls can have a significant 
impact on the environment. 10 
The priorities should be to assess where energy efficiency/demand reduction and 
demand response are most needed, to consider where ICT can contribute to either 
and then to evaluate what a specific development contributes in real-life conditions. 
In summary, given the risks outlined above it is important that smart appliances are 
subjected to comprehensive and proportionate assessment to identify the extent to 
which they contribute to, or detract from, national objectives of energy security and 
sustainability. These assessments should provide evidence to support specification 
of the criteria for smart appliance regulation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
8 Louis, J-N., Calo, A., Leiviskä, K. and Pongracz, E. (2016) Modelling home electricity 
management for sustainability: the impact of response levels, technological deployment and 
occupancy 
Energy and Buildings 119, 218-232 
9 Urban, B., Roth, K. and Harbor, C. (2016) Energy savings from five home automation 
technologies: a scoping study of technical potential. Final report to the Consumer 
Technology Association. Fraunhofer USA Center for Sustainable Energy Systems. 
10 Louis, J-N., Calo, A., Leiviskä, K. and Pongracz, E. (2015) Environmental impacts and 
benefits of smart home automation: life cycle assessment of home energy management 
system. IFAC ²PapersOnLine 48-1, pp. 880-885  
  
 What evidence  you have  favour   against any  the options set out  
incentivise/ensure that these principles are followed?  
 
We favour Option B, taking the view that smart functionality should be regulated 
and optional. It should be optional given that householders have varying priorities 
and limited budgets. For example, they may wish to prioritise energy efficiency over 
smart functionality, an outcome that can also be beneficial to the system as a 
whole. (LED lighting offers a striking example of this.11) Regulation to remove non-
smart appliances (Option C) from the market is not recommended as there is a risk 
that appliance costs are increased and end-use efficiency is sacrificed to smart 
capability. 
 
There are risks of ¶JHtting it ZURQJ· that are particularly associated with smart 
appliances, related to security and sustainability: hence the need to smart 
appliances to regulation that is at least as comprehensive as the testing and 
labelling regime for appliance efficiency . 
Trade-offs between overall demand reduction and flexibility need careful and 
continuing assessment as an integral part of the development of smart systems. 
Smart technologies should be regulated in the same way as energy efficiency, where  
there is a high level of scrutiny and an onus to demonstrate effective at demand 
reduction. Smart technologies should be subject to a similar level of scrutiny and 
government support should only be given to those smart appliances that are proven 
to be most effective in use. This ¶LQ XVH· stipulation is crucial: smart systems work 
through a combination of technological innovation and human activity, machine and 
human intelligence. ¶7HFKQLFDO SRWHQWLDO· assessments are inadequate as a metric 
for effectiveness: there is no substitute for careful trialling in real-life conditions 
over an extended period ² at least a year. 
 
Regulation is also needed to ensure that appliances sold to consumers on the basis 
of being smart meet minimum standards in terms of performance and 
interoperability. If an appliance is smart (i.e. communications-enabled) then it must 
meet certain criteria including minimum levels of flexibility to ensure it acts in the 
best interest of the grid. Regulation is also necessary on the basis of consumer 
                                                 
11 Boardman, B. (2015) Low-energy lights will keep the lights on. Carbon Management 5 (4), 
pp. 361-371. 
  
protection, as the term ¶VPDUW· in appliances is used frequently and with varying 
meanings. There is evidence that a single ¶VHDO of DSSURYDO· style label which is 
backed up by government can be effective at influencing consumer demand12. This 
approach is taken with other successful consumer labels such as the certified 
organic, free trade and marine stewardship council (MSC) labels. For this reason we 
recommend a new flexibility label combined with efforts by government and other 
agencies to educate people about the environmental, network and cost-saving 
benefits of flexibility. 
  you have any evidence  support actions focused  any particular category 
 appliance? 
 
Battery storage systems should be required to be smart (Option C). There is a 
significant risk to grid security if they are not regulated. The majority of domestic 
battery systems currently sold in the UK go to homes with rooftop solar installed. 
These have an incentive to maximise self-consumption and minimise imports, 
whereas the grid and network operators have an incentive to reduce peak demand 
and promote load-shifting to minimize network stresses. Regulation and possibly 
an incentive scheme are needed to align these incentives and prevent risks to grid 
security. 
From a system perspective, the primary purpose of a battery is to provide flexibility 
and batteries provide flexibility at the expense of some efficiency loss - the 
additional energy consumption to enable flexibility is not negligible. Accordingly, 
batteries need to provide additional benefits to outweigh the costs. If flexibility is 
¶bought· from batteries when otherwise it would have been bought from new, 
possibly more efficient, appliances, then arguably it is better to be prioritise 
appliances over batteries as a source of flexibility. If the benefits from batteries in 
one dimension (security) are gained at the expense of another (sustainability) then 
there may still be an argument for continued support along with minimum 
efficiency requirements in order to qualify for battery subsidies or special tariffs. 
This again brings us back to the need for independent assessment of the costs and 
benefits of smart technologies, based on empirical in-use data. 
                                                 
12 Banerjee, A. and Solomon, B.D., 2003. Eco-labeling for energy efficiency and 
sustainability: a meta-evaluation of US programs. Energy Policy, 31(2), pp. 109-123. 
  
 Are there any other barriers  risks  the uptake  smart appliances  
addition  those already identified? 
 
A few further comments:  
(a) Evidence from attempt to develop and market the smart home concept over the 
past half-century indicates that fully-integrated smart homes are far from being 
an inevitable development: the technical, operational and legal risks are still 
considerable in relation to projected benefits, and even more so in relation to 
any realised and measured benefits. This is widely recognised. For example, a 
recent study found that, although the concept was appealing to almost three-
quarters of those surveyed, a third thought that smart home technology makes 
simple tasks unnecessarily complicated13 (a conclusion reflecting the material 
that can be found on many smart tech. user websites and in consumer 
publications). There is little in the way of a value proposition for many smart 
technologies and often a particular product has to resonate with customers 
before they warm to the idea of purchasing smart home technology. Research 
also suggests that customers may fear losing control of their appliances if 
subject to direct load control, worrying that their electricity provider may behave 
as ´ELJ brotherµ14,15. 
(b) The EU referendum result has increased uncertainty in the area of appliance 
standards and labelling, given that many of our standards and labels are 
regulated at EU level. The EU has also traditionally been willing to regulate to 
ensure interoperability and competition in new technology areas, notably in the 
antitrust case against Microsoft regarding the preloading of browser software in 
the Windows operating system16. 
                                                 
13 Krishnamurti, T., Schwartz, D., Davis, A., Fischhoff, B., de Bruin, W.B., Lave, L. and Wang, 
J., 2012. Preparing for smart grid technologies: A behavioral decision research approach to 
understanding consumer expectations about smart meters. Energy Policy, 41, pp.790-797. 
14 Verbong, G.P., Beemsterboer, S. and Sengers, F., 2013. Smart grids or smart users? 
Involving users in developing a low carbon electricity economy. Energy Policy, 52, pp.117-
125. 
15 Balta-Ozkan, N., Davidson, R., Bicket, M. and Whitmarsh, L. (2013) Social barriers to the 
adoption of smart homes. Energy Policy 63, 363-374 
 
16 Antitrust: Commission fines Microsoft for non-compliance with browser choice 
commitments, EC, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-196_en.htm 
  
(c) Smart appliances present risks to cyber security in addition to grid security, but 
security on smart appliances has been weak thus far, notably leading to the 
hijacking of ¶LQWHUQHW of WKLQJV· devices in the attack against internet 
infrastructure provider Dyn in October 201617. 
(d) Household battery storage is not likely to be the most efficient storage 
technology from the perspective of the grid. The evidence suggests that battery 
technology is not yet a profitable investment for households, either18.  
 Are there any other options that  should  considering with regards  
mitigating potential risks,  particular with relation  vulnerable consumers?  
 
The above considerations concerning risk apply to vulnerable consumers, but with 
added force. Vulnerable consumers, by definition, are likely to have fewer resources 
with which to address risks to affordability, energy service reliability and 
operability.  They are also less likely to have access to microgeneration19, in-home 
batteries and highly-efficient or smart appliances; to be taking an active interest in 
energy markets; or to belong to well-developed social networks to assist them in 
adopting and using new technologies. The considerations relating to vulnerable 
customers set out in the review of early learning from smart meter rollout are valid 
for smart systems more widely: vulnerable customers are likely to need more 
support and guidance in choosing and using new technologies; there will be 
specific design needs for some customers in order to make the technologies usable; 
and a need to open up opportunities to share safely in benefits from 
microgeneration, demand aggregation and changes in tariffing.20 As discussed 
above, a prime consideration has always to be the value of any particular ¶VPDUW· 
development in a given situation, and how that value is to be realised.   
Sarah Darby, with thanks to Rebecca Ford, Scott MacDonald and Eoghan McKenna 
for their contributions.  
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19 Darby, SJ (2012) Metering: EU policy and implications for fuel poor households. Energy 
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